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ABSTRACT 
A FRAMEWORK FOR INCIDENT DETECTION AND 
NOTIFICATION IN VEHICULAR AD-HOC 
NETWORKS 
Mahmoud Abuelela 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Stephan Olariu 
The US Department of Transportation (US-DOT) estimates that over half of all 
congestion events are caused by highway incidents rather than by rush-hour traffic 
in big cities. The US-DOT also notes that in a single year, congested highways 
due to traffic incidents cost over $75 billion in lost worker productivity and over 
8.4 billion gallons of fuel. Further, the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration (NHTSA) indicates that congested roads are one of the leading causes of 
traffic accidents, and in 2005 an average of 119 persons died each day in motor 
vehicle accidents. 
Recently, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) employing a combination of 
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) wireless communi-
cation have been proposed to alert drivers to traffic events including accidents, 
lane closures, slowdowns, and other traffic-safety issues. 
In this thesis, we propose a novel framework for incident detection and notification 
dissemination in VANETs. This framework consists of three main components: a 
system architecture, a traffic incident detection engine and a notification dissem-
ination mechanism. The basic idea of our framework is to collect and aggregate 
traffic-related data from passing cars and to use the aggregated information to 
detect traffic anomalies. Finally, the suitably filtered aggregated information is 
disseminated to alert drivers about traffic delays and incidents. 
The first contribution of this thesis is an architecture for the notification of traffic 
incidents, NOTICE for short. In NOTICE, sensor belts are embedded in the road 
at regular intervals, every mile or so. Each belt consists of a collection of pressure 
sensors, a simple aggregation and fusion engine, and a few small transceivers. The 
pressure sensors in each belt allow every message to be associated with a physical 
vehicle passing over that belt. Thus, no one vehicle can pretend to be multiple 
vehicles and there is no need for an ID to be assigned to vehicles. 
Vehicles in NOTICE are fitted with a tamper-resistant Event Data Recorder 
(EDR), very much like the well-known black-boxes onboard commercial aircraft. 
EDRs are responsible for storing vehicles behavior between belts such as accelera-
tion, deceleration and lane changes. Importantly, drivers can provide input to the 
EDR, using a simple menu, either through a dashboard console or through verbal 
input. 
The second contribution of this thesis is to develop incident detection techniques 
that use the information provided by cars in detecting possible incidents and traffic 
anomalies using intelligent inference techniques. For this purpose, We developed 
deterministic and probabilistic techniques to detect both blocking incidents, acci-
dents for examples, as well as non-blocking ones such as potholes. To the best of 
our knowledge, our probabilistic technique is the first VANET based automatic 
incident detection technique that is capable of detecting both blocking and non 
blocking incidents. 
Our third contribution is to provide an analysis for vehicular traffic proving that 
VANETs tend to be disconnected in many highway scenarios, consisting of a col-
lection of disjoint clusters. We also provide an analytical way to compute the 
expected cluster size and we show that clusters are quite stable over time. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first in the VANET community to prove ana-
lytically that disconnection is the norm rather than the exceptions in VANETs. 
Our fourth contribution is to develop data dissemination techniques specifically 
adapted to VANETs. With VANETs disconnection in mind, we developed data 
dissemination approaches that efficiently propagate messages between cars and 
belts on the road. We proposed two data dissemination techniques, one for di-
vided roads and another one for undivided roads. We also proposed a probabilistic 
technique used by belts to determine how far should an incident notification be 
sent to alert approaching drivers. 
Our fifth contribution is to propose a security technique to avoid possible attacks 
from malicious drivers as well as preserving driver's privacy in data dissemination 
and notification delivery in NOTICE. We also proposed a belt clustering scheme 
to reduce the probability of having a black-hole in the message dissemination while 
reducing also the operational burden if a belt is compromised. 
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The US Department of Transportation (US-DOT) estimates that over half of all 
congestion events are caused by highway incidents rather than by rush-hour traffic 
in big cities [1]. The US-DOT also notes that in a single year, congested highways 
due to traffic incidents cost over $75 billion in lost worker productivity and over 8.4 
billion gallons of fuel. Further, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) indicates that congested roads are one of the leading causes of traffic 
accidents, and in 2005 an average of 119 persons died each day in motor vehicle 
accidents [2]. 
Given sufficient advance notification of traffic incidents, drivers could make 
educated decisions about taking alternate routes. This would improve overall 
traffic safety by reducing the severity of congestion while saving both time and 
fuel in the process. On most US highways, congestion is a daily event and advance 
notification of imminent congestion is unavailable [2]. 
Recently, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) employing a combination of 
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) wireless communi-
cation have been proposed to alert drivers to traffic events including accidents, 
lane closures, slowdowns, and other traffic-safety issues. In the US, VANETs are 
using 75MHz of spectrum in the 5.850 to 5.925 GHz band specially allocated by 
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for Dedicated Short Range 
Communications (DSRC) [3]. 
In spite of their close resemblance to Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), 
with which they share the same underlying philosophy, VANETs have a number 
of specific characteristics that set them apart from MANETs. First, while most 
MANETs are deployed in support of special-purpose operations including disaster 
relief, search-and-rescue, law-enforcement and multimedia classrooms, all of which 
are intrinsically short-lived and involve a small number of nodes, VANETs may 
involve thousands of fast-moving vehicles over hundreds of miles of roadways and 
streets. Second, and perhaps more importantly, while MANETs may experience 
transient periods of loss of connectivity, in VANETs, especially under sparse traf-
fic conditions, extended periods of disconnection are the norm rather than the 
exception. 
This dissertation follows the style of The IEEE Transactions 
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In most of the systems, developed for incident notifications in VANETs, indi-
vidual vehicles are responsible for inferring the presence of an incident based on 
reports from other vehicles. This invites a host of serious and well-documented 
security attacks [4,5] intended to cause vehicles to make incorrect inferences, pos-
sibly resulting in increased traffic congestion and a higher chance of severe acci-
dents. Not surprisingly, the problem of providing security in VANETs is starting 
to attract well-deserved attention [4-6]. 
As a consequence, much of the recent work assume that VANETs will rely on 
a pervasive and costly roadside infrastructure that acts as encryption key distri-
bution points or authentication authorities [4,5]. Unfortunately, in addition to 
being prohibitively expensive to build and to maintain, this roadside infrastruc-
ture is very likely to be the target of vandalism that will hamper its intended 
functionality. Indeed, the way in which current systems are set up, the driver of 
a vehicle that participates in the traffic will not be able to preserve their privacy 
and may be subject to impersonation or Sybil attacks. It was argued that even 
if pseudonyms are used, detecting the true identity of the driver and, therefore, 
invading their privacy appears to be difficult to prevent [7]. 
1.1 OUR CONTRIBUTION 
In this thesis, we propose a novel framework for incident detection and notification 
dissemination in VANETs. This framework consists mainly of three components: 
a system architecture, a traffic incident detection engine and a notification dis-
semination mechanism. The basic idea of our framework is to collect data from 
passing cars about their experience on the road, then use this data to detect traf-
fic anomalies and finally notify drivers about traffic delays and incidents, if any. 
Figure 1 shows the main three components of the proposed framework and how 
they interact with each other. 
The first component of our framework is an architecture for the notification 
of traffic incidents, NOTICE for short. In NOTICE, sensor belts are embedded 
in the road at regular intervals every mile or so. Each belt consists of a collec-
tion of pressure sensors, a simple aggregation and fusion engine, and a few small 
transceivers. The pressure sensors in each belt allow every message to be asso-
ciated with a physical vehicle passing over that belt. Thus, no one vehicle can 
pretend to be multiple vehicles and there is no need for an ID to be assigned 
to vehicles. Vehicles in NOTICE are fitted with a tamper-resistant Event Data 
Recorder (EDR), like the well-known black-boxes on-board commercial aircraft. 
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EDRs are responsible for storing vehicles behavior between belts such as acceler-
ation, decelerations and change lanes. Importantly, the driver can provide input 
to the EDR, using a simple menu, either through a dashboard console or through 
verbal input. 
Notification dissemination Incident detection engine 
NOTICE'S belt 
FIG. 1: The proposed framework interacting components 
NOTICE'S belts are collecting data from passing cars about their experience 
on the road such as lane changes, stoppages, accelerations and decelerations. This 
information in turn is fed to our incident detection engine. 
Our second contribution is to develop incident detection techniques that use 
the information provided by cars and drivers in detecting possible incidents and 
road anomalies. Traditional automatic incident detection techniques have been in-
tegrated on the top of our framework, showing that our framework is generic and 
mixes the benefits of both traditional techniques and VANETs based techniques. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a VANET based auto-
matic incident detection technique that is capable of detecting both non blocking 
incidents as well as blocking incidents. 
Our third contribution is to provide an analysis for vehicular traffic proving 
that VANETs tend to be disconnected in many highway scenarios , consisting of 
a collection of disjoint clusters. We also provide an analytical way to compute 
the expected cluster size and we show that clusters are quite stable over time. To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first in the VANET community to prove 
analytically that disconnection is the norm rather than the exceptions in VANETs. 
Our fourth contribution is to develop data dissemination techniques specifically 
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adapted to VANETs. With VANETs disconnection in mind, we developed data 
dissemination approaches that efficiently propagate messages between cars and 
belts on the road. We proposed two data dissemination techniques for both divided 
and undivided roads. We also proposed a probabilistic technique used by belts 
to determine how far should an incident notification be sent to alert approaching 
drivers. 
Finally, we propose a security technique to avoid possible attacks from ma-
licious drivers as well as preserving driver's privacy in data dissemination and 
notification delivery in NOTICE. We also proposed a belt clustering scheme to 
reduce the probability of having a black-hole in the message dissemination while 
reducing the operational burden if a belt is compromised. 
1.2 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows, in Chapter II, we briefly 
describe related work in the areas of incident detection, information dissemination 
and security in VANET. Chapter III is devoted to present NOTICE, the main in-
frastructure used by our framework to receive, process, aggregate and analyze data 
from passing vehicles as well as sending notifications back to them when needed. 
In Chapter IV, we present our techniques for automatic incident detection imple-
mented on the top of NOTICE. Our data dissemination techniques are described 
in Chapter VI. Chapter VII is devoted to present a security technique for infor-
mation dissemination. Finally, Chapter VIII concludes our work and highlights 




In this chapter, we discuss some approaches and techniques proposed in the lit-
erature to handle automatic incident detection, data dissemination and security 
techniques in VANET showing their limitations addressed by the proposed frame-
work. 
II.l AUTOMATIC INCIDENT DETECTION 
Roadway incidents refer to non-recurring events resulting in traffic congestion 
or disruption, including accidents, breakdowns, debris, spilled loads, inclement 
weather, unscheduled maintenance, construction activities, and other unusual or 
special events affecting roadways [8]. The goal of an incident detection technique is 
to automatically identify the occurrence of an unpredicted incident and its location 
as accurately and quickly as possible [9]. 
This section is devoted to discussing different automatic incident detection 
techniques proposed by other researchers. We divide incidents into two categories, 
temporary and permanent. By temporary incidents, we mean those incidents that 
block the way and force vehicles to change lanes or either wait until cleared. Vehicle 
accidents are a good example of this category. On the other hand, permanent 
incidents do not block the way and vehicles may avoid or may pass over them. 
Potholes are examples of this category. 
II. 1.1 Temporary Incident Detection 
Most developed techniques, for temporary incident detection, rely mainly on traf-
fic measurements acquired at inductive loop detectors (ILDs) or video detection 
cameras installed at regular spacing along the freeways. These detectors or cam-
eras measure traffic parameters such as volume, average speed and occupancy, and 
transmit the measured statistics back to the traffic management center at fixed 
time intervals of 30 seconds or 1 minute. 
Pattern-based algorithms are the most common algorithms in current opera-
tion. They work from occupancy, traffic volume and traffic flow information that 
are usually collected from inductive loops. By identifying patterns in the data that 
are not considered normal for a stretch of road, potential incidents are recognized. 
The most famous example in this category is the California Algorithm [10]. The 
basic idea of the California Algorithm is to compare traffic occupancy differences 
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between two adjacent detectors An incident is detected if all of the following 
values exceeds some preestabhshed thresholds [10] 
1 The absolute difference in the measured occupancy between the upstream 
and downstream detectors 
2 The difference m the measured occupancy between the upstream and down-
stream detector stations relative to the occupancy level at the upstream 
station 
3 The relative difference in the measured occupancy from two minutes ago as 
compared to the current occupancy level at the downstream detector 
Catastrophe Theory takes its name from the sudden discrete changes that occur 
m one variable of interest while other related variables are exhibiting smooth and 
continuous change These variables are speed, flow and occupancy When speed 
drops dramatically without a corresponding increase in occupancy and flow, the 
alarm sounds In this regard, Catastrophe Theory based algorithms are able to 
differentiate between incidents and recurring congestion The most recognized 
algorithm that fits into this classification is the McMaster algorithm [11] 
Studies showed that relying on cellular phones can detect 38% of the incidents 
with an average of 5 minutes mean detection time This is probably because severe 
incidents are likely to get immediate attention from other road users Studies also 
show that cell-phone based detection could detect only 1% of non server incidents 
such as stall vehicles as they do not get much attention from passing drivers [12] 
These are in addition to statistical methods as in [13], artificial intelligence [14], 
Fuzzy Set Logic [15] and vision detection techniques as in [16] 
In [17], a DSRC-based approach is introduced for automatic incident detection 
where roadside infrastructures are installed along the highway every one mile or 
so If vehicles average travel times is longer than the expected time between two 
roadsides an alarm is raised 
II.1.2 Permanent Incident Detection 
Pothole Patrol or P2 [18] is a system to detect potholes on the road In P2, 
every vehicle is equipped with an embedded device that detects potholes when 
they are passed over using three-axis acceleration sensors, which are widely used 
today in detecting cell-phones orientation and protecting hard drives when they 
fall down In P2, the output of these sensors are being sampled at a high frequency 
to detect the shock of a vehicle when it passes over a pothole When a vehicle has 
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a Wifi connectivity with an open access point or even through cellular networks, 
it uploads its detection information to a central server over the Internet. This 
central server in turn aggregates information from various vehicles and produces 
a list of detected potholes, after some manual filtering. 
Vision-based techniques [19] have been proposed in the transportation research 
community to detect potholes by looking for some patterns in the field of view. 
II. 1.3 Disadvantages of Current Techniques 
All of the techniques that use ILDs or video detection cameras to measure traf-
fic parameters assign vehicles a passive role in the detection process. With the 
current development and research in VANETs, where vehicles have the ability to 
communicate with each other as well as with roadside infrastructures, vehicles are 
able to play a very active role in holding messages and giving inputs to the detec-
tion system. So, existing algorithms and techniques are losing much information 
by ignoring this fact. 
Also, it is fundamentally difficult to detect non-blocking accidents and those 
that occur under light load, as the deviation from normal traffic patterns may be 
negligible [20]. 
The third limitation is that most of these algorithms cannot detect where 
exactly the incident occurred or even what exactly happened. All they can provide 
is that there is an incident between two ILDs. Thus, inter-spacing between ILDs 
has to be small enough to get better accuracy of the incident location. 
The fourth shortcoming is the high failure rate and maintenance cost of ILDs. 
For example, studies show that up to 50% of ILDs can be defective at a given 
time and worse yet the maintenance cost can be up to 40, 000 annually in a single 
city [9] 
The fifth limitations is that relying on cell-phone calls still has some problems 
because minor events (breakdowns which occur with greater frequency and do not 
present a hazard to other motorists or some obstacles that block only a single lane) 
are often not reported by other motorists. Also about 7% of all reported incidents 
by cellular phones are false alarms (moving violations and other events that could 
not be verified). The false alarm rate for other events is much higher (32 percent), 
reflecting cellular-phone callers' difficulties in judging whether vehicles are resting 
in the freeway shoulders or broken [12]. 
The sixth limitation is that even though vision detection techniques may be 
very helpful to detect different kinds of incidents, they would fail at many situ-
ations like fog, heavy rain and very bright sun at which most accidents usually 
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happen. Also, it is very expensive to install these devices along all highways. 
Finally, false positive alarms have been unacceptably high for operational pur-
poses [21]. In the case of freeway operations, where detection algorithms contin-
uously verify the existence of incidents, apparently low false alarms may actually 
demand huge, if not unfeasible, emergency response deployment. For instance, 
considering that real-time data are fed into the system in 30 seconds time periods, 
and that the occurrence of an incident is checked at every time period; an AID al-
gorithm with false alarm rate of 2% would yield, on average, 57.6 false alarms per 
day per pair of neighboring ILDs, which means that, for a single freeway segment 
containing 70 ILDs, approximately 4,000 (24hours/day x 3600sec/hour / 30sec x 
0.02) false alarms would be triggered daily! This represents an average of one 
false alarm every 90 seconds. Not knowing if such incident alarms are in fact false 
without further investigation, the Traffic Management Center (TMC) personnel 
would respond to them diligently at first but soon grow weary of the constant 
false alarms and discredit the otherwise useful AID. Therefore, the system would 
eventually be rendered useless and abandoned. 
On the other hand for permanent incident detection, P 2 showed good results 
when implemented over 6 taxis in Boston area. However, it suffers from many dis-
advantages. Firstly, relying on a central server is neither reliable nor scalable and 
acts as a single point of failure. Secondly, P2 generates many false positive alarms 
because railroads and speed ramps would be detected by a vehicle as potholes. 
Thirdly, and may be most importantly, typical drivers (those who are not collect-
ing training data) usually strive to avoid potholes by changing lanes or slowing 
down to save their vehicles. So, P2 will not be able to detect a pothole when it is 
avoided. 
II.2 DATA DISSEMINATION IN VANETS 
Data dissemination is an essential component of VANETs for many applications 
especially safety related ones to alert drivers about local traffic incidents. Al-
though VANETs shares many concepts with traditional Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
(MANETs), VAENTS is characterized by its high mobility and frequent disconnec-
tion. This key differentiation causes traditional MANETs routing and data dissem-
ination techniques such as AODV [22] and DSR [23] not suitable for VANETs [24]. 
Not surprisingly, a number of data dissemination techniques have been pro-
posed for VANET. These techniques can be classified into different categories 
as being Unicast [25] [26], Multicast [27] or Broadcast [28] [29]. VANET data 
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dissemination techniques can also be classified as relying on the existence of an 
infrastructure [30] or they can work with zero infrastructure support [31]. 
For the sake of this thesis, we divide data dissemination techniques in VANET 
into two categories: (1) Techniques that assume the existence of end-to-end con-
nectivity between vehicles. (2) Techniques that take lack of connectivity into 
consideration. Noticeable techniques from the first category are GVGrid [31], 
MURU [32] and PBR [33]. Noticeable techniques from the second category are 
CAR [26] for divided roads and DPP [34] for undivided roads. 
GVGrid is an on-demand, position-based routing protocol that constructs a 
route from a static source node to vehicles that may exist in a destination region. 
GVGrid constructs a routing path from the source to the destination by grid-based 
approach, which divides the map into several grids. It also maintains the route 
when it breaks because of the vehicle mobility. GVGrid tries to discover, based 
on vehicle mobility characteristics, a route that is expected to provide the best 
stability. 
MURU is a multi-hop routing protocol intended to find robust paths in urban 
VANETs. MURU tries to minimize the probability of path breakage by exploit-
ing mobility information of each vehicle and by using a special parameter called 
expected disconnection degree factor to select the most robust path from source 
to destination. MURU implicitly assumes that there will be many paths between 
source and destination and it strives to select the most stable one. 
Position Based Routing (PBR) protocol was presented where packet forwarding 
decisions are made based on power awareness. The basic routing strategy is a 
variant of greedy forwarding where the next hop is selected to be the vehicle 
closest to the destination. While this strategy is correct, it may lead to unnecessary 
forwarding and, ultimately, to wasting bandwidth. 
Connectivity-Aware Routing (CAR) was developed taking into consideration 
the fact that end-to-end connectivity is not guaranteed in VANETs. The main 
idea of CAR is to try finding a connected path between the source and destination 
even if it is not the shortest one, this is being done using a route discovery process 
before the real data can be sent. This is because the longer fully connected path is 
better than shortest path that may experience lack of connectivity at some point. 
Directional Propagation Protocol (DPP) [34] utilizes the directionality of data 
and vehicles for packet propagation. DPP considers real traffic scenarios in which 
vehicles form clusters on the road and these clusters may be disconnected from 
each other. DPP uses co-directional clusters that run in the same direction as 
the packet in the data delivery process. When disconnection occurs between two 
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co-directional clusters A and C, cluster B in the opposite direction will be used 
as bridges between A and C, if such oncoming cluster B exists. To guarantee 
packet delivery, DPP uses the idea of message custody, that is the current car a 
in cluster A that holds the packet will keep buffering that packet until it receives 
confirmation from some car c in cluster C. However, as we show later, DPP is 
likely to waste significant bandwidth because of uneven traffic density as well as 
imposing delays on packets propagation [35]. 
In [36], an analytical model for DPP is introduced in which the expected 
distance between clusters, the expected disconnection time and the effective prop-
agation rate were computed. However, the model of [36] does not explain why 
traffic clustering is inherent to VANETs. 
In [30], a realistic traffic scenario is considered in which vehicles may form clus-
ters that are disconnected from each other. A hybrid routing protocol is introduced 
that can route a packet inside a cluster but relies on a pre-existing infrastructure 
to connect these clusters. Although, this protocol considers real traffic situations, 
its reliance on a pre-existing infrastructure is problematic. Indeed, the cost of 
installing roadside infrastructures along roadway is prohibitively expensive. 
The main disadvantage of existing data dissemination techniques is that they 
either do not take frequent VANET disconnection into consideration such as GV-
Grid, MURU and PBR. On the other hand, other techniques that take discon-
nections into consideration suffer from many disadvantages like routing loops and 
wasting a lot of limited resources by sending unnecessary messages in their data 
dissemination. 
As we described before in Chapter I, one of our contributions is to provide an 
analytical proof that end-to-end connectivity is not guaranteed in VANET in may 
traffic conditions. We also proposed techniques for efficient data dissemination 
in disconnected VANET for both divided and undivided roads. Therefore, it is 
natural to compare our proposed data dissemination techniques with those that 
had same assumption such as DPP and CAR. 
II.3 SECURITY IN VANETS 
The main goal for VANET is to increase road safety. To achieve this, the vehicles 
act as sensors and exchange warnings that enables the drivers to react early to 
abnormal and potentially dangerous situations like accidents, traffic jams or any 
impacting incidents on the road. In addition, authorized entities like police or 
fire fighters should be able to send alarm signals and instructions [37]. Like any 
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communication system, security plays a vital role in VANET communication. As 
VANET consists of vehicular nodes which are moving at high speeds, efficient and 
secure routing protocols are highly desirable [38]. 
Safety applications shall use VANET to communicate; hence the warning mes-
sages should be authenticated [38]. Thus, Security is an essential component for 
VANET when notifying drivers about traffic incidents. Otherwise, an attacker 
may send notifications about fake incidents, which discredit the otherwise useful 
system. In order to secure VANETs, the following security requirements should 
be met [37] [39]: 
1. Integrity: the security infrastructure has to provide mechanisms that prevent 
or at least detect message modification. This prevents malicious vehicles 
from modifying forwarded messages and protects message integrity for all 
application categories. Authentication is also needed to keep outsiders from 
injecting messages about incident that does not exist. 
2. Confidentiality: a very dangerous and ignored fact about privacy is that 
innocent looking data from various sources can be accumulated over a long 
period and evaluated automatically revealing much information about these 
sources [40]. Even small correlations of the data may reveal useful informa-
tion. For instance, the knowledge about specific sensor characteristics may 
give some hints about the make and the model of a car. This in turn may be 
related to other information to identify a specific car. Moreover, users are 
unlikely willing to participate in a system breaching their privacy. VANET's 
value would actually be very limited If not enough nodes exist [41]. As a 
matter of fact, privacy is one of the main challenge facing vehicular ad hoc 
networks. Whenever vehicular nodes attempt to access some services from 
roadside infrastructure, they want to maintain the necessary privacy without 
being tracked down for whoever they are, wherever they are and whatever 
they are doing. It is considered as one of the important security requirements 
that should be paid more attention for secure VANET schemes [42]. 
3. Availability: because most VANET messages are related to driving condi-
tions and road safety, fast processing of these messages is important. Also, 
VANET consists of thousands of vehicles running on hundreds of miles of 
highways and streets. So, any proposed security approach should be fully 
distributed and don't rely on a single point of failure or bottleneck to be 
able to efficiently handle that large scale system. 
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VANET's security techniques may be divided into two categories namely posi-
tion verification and securing incident notification Position verification is required 
to verify if a vehicles is lying about its position and/or its speed Several tech-
niques have been proposed in literature to verify whether vehicle's broadcasted 
position is correct or not For example, a technique for verifying the claimed loca-
tion using a directional radar has been proposed in [43] Another technique that 
uses radio signal direction strength to determine the transmitter location has been 
proposed in [44] Also, a technique that uses received signal strength and laser 
range finders for position verification has been proposed in [45] 
On the other hand, securing incident notification may be defined simply as 
authenticating the sender of the notification while preserving privacy of both the 
sender and the receiver In this thesis, we are interested in securing incident 
notification m VANETs 
Proposing incident detection techniques with low false positive rate is one of 
our contribution m this thesis However, if a malicious attacker could send a 
false notification to passing vehicles, these passing vehicles would not be able to 
differentiate whether this is a false alarm from our incident detection engine or a 
fake message sent by an attacker, which discredit the whole system as drivers will 
simply ignore even real notification sent by real belts in the future 
Most of the proposed security techniques for incident notification rely on the 
usage of public authority distributing keys between vehicles For example, m [46], 
a Certificate Authority (CA) that provides and manages certificates for all vehicles 
on the road has been assumed to exist Thus, a typical authentication approach 
between vehicles may be performed using the provided public/private keys along 
with public certificates Actually these solutions have many shortcomings First, 
the CA is a single point of failure and perhaps very dangerous if compromised 
by a malicious user Second, giving a vehicle a few pairs of public/private keys 
makes it easy to be tracked violating privacy of drivers Third, and may be most 
importantly, a malicious driver can authenticate himself and send fake messages 
to other cars that causes the last problem which is the complexity of granting and 
revocation of certificates for such a huge community of vehicles [47] It was also 
argued in [7] that even if pseudonyms are used, detecting the true identity of the 
driver and, therefore, invading their privacy appears to be difficult to prevent 
In [4], a security protocol was introduced by creating a large number of anony-
mous certificates m vehicles With a pool of around 43,800 certificates, each 
vehicle randomly chooses one of the available certificates for signing the message 
at one time in order to meet the drivers privacy requirement Although this 
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technique can effectively meet the privacy requirement, it can hardly become a 
scalable and reliable approach, because the ID management authority has to keep 
all the anonymous certificates for each vehicle in the administrative region. Once 
a malicious message is detected, the authority has to exhaustedly search in a very 
huge database with size up to (43800 certificates * millions of cars) to find the ID 
related to the compromised anonymous public key. 
A number of security mechanisms to complement the Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) in VANET havs been proposed in [47]. In that regard, the authors proposed 
mechanisms to enhance location privacy, efficient authentication and certificate 
revocation. The authors also proposed a mechanism for efficiently mitigating the 
effect of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. However, like any other approach that 
gives vehicles a pair of public/private keys, distributing the revocation information 
to the vehicles is still a problem in VANET because of its large scale. Another 
problem with this approach is that building a global reputation-based system while 
supporting privacy preservation is hard to obtain because preserving the privacy 
of users requires frequent identity changes. Consequently, linking the reputation 
of a user to all its identities may contradict preserving the privacy of that user. 
The main goal of our contribution to security in this thesis is to enhance 
NOTICE architecture to meet all of the security requirements listed above. (1) 
Vehicles should be able to authenticate belts and receive incident notification only 
from real ones. (2) A driver's privacy has to be preserved and a vehicle should 
not be associated with any unique identifier. (3) A malicious attacker should not 
be able to eavesdrop on the communications between a belt and a vehicle to gain 
any information about the vehicle's experience on the road, which may reveal its 
identity. (4) An attacker should not be able to change the meaning of a message 




NOTICE: THE ARCHITECTURE 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the basic functionality of NO-
TICE, a secure and privacy-aware architecture for the Notification Of Traffic InCi-
dEnts [48]. NOTICE is the infrastructure used by our framework to detect traffic 
incidents and to notify drivers about them when they exist. 
One of the underlying philosophies of NOTICE, and our framework in turn, 
is that the decision about traffic-related information should rest with the infras-
tructure and not with individual vehicles that may have incorrect or incomplete 
knowledge. 
Instead of relying on a vulnerable roadside infrastructure, we propose to embed 
sensor belts in the road at regular intervals (e.g., every km or so), as illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
Each belt consists of a collection of pressure sensors, a simple aggregation and 
fusion engine, and a few small transceivers. For robustness and fault tolerance, 
roadside solar panels of the type currently used on US highways can supplement 
the energy needs of the belts. We expect this configuration to be less expensive 
than a single ILD, even without the expensive optical fiber needed to interconnect 
the ILDs. The pressure sensors in each belt allow every message to be associated 
with a physical vehicle passing over the belt. Thus, no single vehicle can pretend to 
be multiple vehicles and there is no need for an ID to be assigned to each vehicle. 
There are three immediate benefits of using belts over roadside infrastructure. 
Firstly, the belts are far less prone to tampering. Secondly, they are better placed 
to detect passing vehicles and interact with them in a simple, secure and privacy-
preservation fashion. Thirdly, a recent prototype [49] has confirmed that suitably 
encased belts are more robust, more reliable and longer-lived than ILDs. 
III.l BELT MODEL 
Each belt is fitted with a few transceivers, at least one per lane of traffic, with a 
maximum communication range of 6 m. Consequently, the belts do not commu-
nicate with each other directly. Instead, adjacent belts rely on passing vehicles to 
communicate. 
Referring back to Figure 2, featuring a two-lane roadway, each lane on the 
roadway has its own dedicated belt. For example, belt C consists of two logical 
sub-belts, each serving one lane. In the case of a divided highway, belts on opposite 
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FIG. 2: Illustrating NOTICE architecture 
sides of the median are connected by direct wired connection under the median. 
It is assumed, therefore, that the sub-belts can communicate directly in a secure 
way. 
Referring again to Figure 2, consider the lane wherein the traffic is moving 
right-to-left. If belt C wants to communicate a message m to the next belt, D, it 
will encrypt m with a time-varying shared symmetric key [i(C, D, t) known only to 
belts C and D, with t representing the time parameter. We assume that the belts 
are roughly synchronized in time and that they switch from one key to the next in 
a pre-established key-chain based on their local time. Tight time synchronization 
between belts is not essential, given the inherent delays in communications. 
III.2 VEHICLE MODEL 
Here we discuss the basic vehicle's model while more assumptions will be stated 
later when needed. As has been suggested in [6,7,50], we assume that each vehicle 
will be fitted with a tamper-resistant Event Data Recorder (EDR), much like the 
well-known black-boxes onboard commercial aircraft. The EDR provides tamper-
resistant storage of statistical and private data. 
In its August 2006 ruling, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NTHSA) has mandated that starting September 2010 an EDR will have to be 
installed in light cars (those vehicles with an unleaded weight of less than 5, 000 
lbs). In NTHSA's terminology, an EDR is described as a device or function in a 
vehicle that records the vehicle dynamic, time-series data [51]. It is, perhaps, less 
well known that some car and truck manufacturers were offering EDR devices on 
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a voluntary basis. For example, it is not widely known that some GM vehicles 
as old as model year 1994 were equipped with an EDR-like device able to store 
retrievable data. Thus the use of an EDR is very much in line with the stipulations 
of NTHSA and should not be construed as a substantial change in vehicle design. 
The EDR is also responsible for recording essential mobility attributes. For this 
purpose, all of the vehicles sub-assemblies, including the GPS unit, speedometer, 
gas tank reading, tire pressure sensors, and sensors for outside temperature, feed 
their own readings into the EDR. These sub-assemblies can report such attributes 
as the current geographic position, current speed, momentary acceleration or de-
celeration, lane changes, and swerving. As a consequence, given a time interval / 
of interest, the EDR can store information such as the highest and lowest speed 
during / , the position and time of the strongest deceleration during / , as well as 
location p, time t and target lane in a lane change. 
The EDR is also fitted with a cell-phone programmed to call predefined num-
bers (including E-911) in the case of an emergency. For example, a driver may be 
incapacitated as a result of the accident and may be physically unable to place 
the call. This feature exists already on some vehicles and is a useful for reporting, 
upon the deployment of an airbag, that the vehicle was probably involved in a 
collision. This allows the authorities to be alerted in real-time to major traffic 
events and, ultimately, saves lives. Importantly, the driver can provide input to 
the EDR, using a simple menu, either through a dashboard console or through 
verbal input. This is useful feature that allows individual vehicles to alert NO-
TICE of traffic incidents that are otherwise hard to detect, such as roadway icing 
and the presence of stray animals on the roadway. Also, false driver input may be 
verified using other sensors data. For example, a belt can reject a report provided 
by a drivers about a broken car around a position that his car's EDR shows that 
the car has passed over that position. 
Recently, much research and patents have been proposed for automatic 
lane detection [52-54]. Consequently, we assume that vehicles can detect 
lane changes. Moreover, the vehicle's EDR is responsible for maintaining 
a set of records about every lane change. Each record has the form < 
FromLane,ToLane, Position, Time >. For example, if an EDR contains the fol-
lowing records (< 0,0,1000, *i >,< 0,1,400, t2 >,< 1,0,200, t3 > ). This means 
that the vehicle was originally at lane 0 then at time t2 and position 400, that 
vehicle changed lane to lane 1 then it went back to lane 0 at time t3 and position 
200. Note that the first record does not record any lane change, instead it just 
shows the initial position of a vehicle after the previous belt. Whenever a vehicle 
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passes through a belt, it drops its EDR data then initializes it and starts recording 
again until next belt 
Thus, the EDR contains all information about lane changes made accelera-
tions, decelerations, driver inputs and other input fed by sensors installed at its 
vehicle 
III.3 BELT TO VEHICLE COMMUNICATION 
We now give a succinct description of the communication between a belt and a 
passing vehicle Consider vehicle c traveling at lOOkm/h (approximately, 65mph 
- the legal interstate speed in most US states) and approaching belt C Once 
the pressure sensors in belt C have detected the front wheels of vehicle c, a radio 
transceiver in the belt will send, at a very low power (range of about lm) , a 
"Hello" beacon on a standard control channel containing the ID, C, of the belt, as 
well as handshaking information This information includes a frequency channel 
A on which data is to be exchanged 
Once vehicle c receives this information, it will have roughly 36 ms (time to 
travel 1 m and thus becomes out of communication range) to respond As the 
handshaking response will be very short and will not be encrypted, a NOTICE-
equipped vehicle will have no problem responding in time If belt C does not 
receive a reply to the handshake, it will not communicate further with vehicle c 
If vehicle c confirms the handshake before it leaves the radio range, belt C 
will send on channel A a query that will be received by the vehicle's transceiver 
Vehicle c will drop the following to belt C 
• the enciypted message uploaded by the previous belt, say B, if provided 
• the relevant data collected by its EDR in the time interval I(B C), which 
is the time spent traveling between belts B and C 
If there is traffic-related information that concerns vehicle c, belt C will upload 
this information to the vehicle Belt C may also upload a message m destined for 
the next belt, say D Message m is encrypted with the symmetric key /J,(C, D, t), 
a time-varying shared key between belts D and C that we introduced m Section 
III 1 The message is stored in the EDR and will be dropped off with belt D at the 
appropriate time The vehicle does not know the key /^(C, D, t) and, consequently, 
cannot decrypt the message destined for belt D 
For the data exchange between the belt and the vehicle, the belt uses a 
transceiver with slightly higher range than that of the handshaking transceiver, 
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about 3 m. Since the transceiver on the vehicle that will perform data exchange is 
placed at the rear of the vehicle, there will be a total range of 6 m (as the vehicle 
passes over the belt) for data exchange. This gives the belt and the vehicle about 
216 ms to complete the communication. 
Here we show that 216 ms is a feasible communication time period for the data 
exchange between the belt and the vehicle. Let s be the transmission time for a 
single message, d be the encryption/decryption time for a single message, and p 
be the processing time for the belt to incorporate new information. There are a 
total of 5 messages sent after handshaking (belt sends initial query, vehicle sends 
message from previous belt, vehicle sends EDR data, belt sends new information 
for vehicle, and belt sends message for next belt) and 2 encryption/decryption 
events (belt decrypts message from previous belt and encrypts message for next 
belt). This results in a total communication time T = (5s + 2d + p) ms. If we 
set p = 50 ms, d = 20 ms, and s = 1 ms (corresponding to a 750-byte message 
at 6 Mbps, the lower end of DSRC [17]), then T = 95ms. These are conservative 
estimates, as we anticipate messages to be much smaller than 750 bytes, at least for 
the first query sent by the belt. Even with these conservative estimates, for 95 ms 
to be too little time for communication, the vehicle would have to be traveling at 
227km/h (141 mph), an illegal, not to mention an unsafe, speed on US highways. 
The very short-range radio transmission used in the vehicle to belt commu-
nication is deliberate. It renders the communication strictly local and, therefore, 
reduces the chances of eavesdropping by malicious entities positioned by the road-
side. We note here that the belt to vehicle and vehicle to belt data exchanges 
discussed above are perfectly anonymous and do not interfere with vehicle or 
driver privacy. Indeed, the pressure sensors in the belts allow NOTICE to asso-
ciate every message with a physical vehicle passing over the belt. We note also 
that a given vehicle cannot interact with a belt more than once in a reasonable 
time interval. So, impersonation and Sybil attacks are difficult to perpetrate. In 
addition, because messages carried by vehicles between belts are encrypted, these 
messages are secure. 
III.4 INCIDENT DETECTION 
A belt is collecting EDRs information from passing vehicles where each EDR 
stores information about the behavior of its vehicle since the previous belt. Thus, 
NOTICE relies on accumulated pieces of evidence deduced from the EDRs in 
conjunction with driver input and intelligent data mining to detect traffic-related 
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incidents. Details of the proposed incident detection techniques are presented in 
Chapter IV. 
111.5 NOTIFICATION DISSEMINATION 
Referring to Figure 2, assume that belt A' is aware of the accident and has informed 
belt A about that. Vehicles in the opposite direction of the accident may be used 
to carry the message in order to notify other vehicles approaching the accident. 
For example, when vehicle x passes over belt A, the belt will upload information 
to x about the incident destined for belt B. In order to propagate the message to 
belt B, the simplest for vehicle x is to continue traveling until it drops the message 
with belt B. Thus, message propagation time depends upon the speed of vehicle 
x. When the information about the traffic incident reaches belt B (and belt C 
and belt D), it will inform belt B' (and C" and D') to alert vehicles traveling 
towards the accident. These vehicles in turn may use their navigation system that 
may suggest an alternate route. Although having vehicles working as data mules, 
carrying messages, between belts is simple and easy to implement, this technique 
suffers from long propagation delay especially when we send the message several 
miles back and/or when traffic on the opposite direction is slow. So, we proposed 
efficient techniques to disseminate messages between belts. These techniques will 
be presented in Chapter VI. 
111.6 ROLE BASED VEHICLE TO BELT COMMUNICATION 
There are exceptional cases where the communication between belts and passing 
vehicles needs to be augmented to allow authorized vehicles to interact with the 
belts in a predetermined, role-based, fashion. This feature is essential to the 
interaction of NOTICE with first responders, ambulances, fire fighters, local police, 
and traffic management personnel in case of emergency operations. 
111.7 CUSTOMIZED INTERFACE 
As stated in Section III.2, each driver has an input console to provide input to the 
detection system. The same console can be used to alert drivers about different 
road incidents. Also, drivers may have an interface to customize their preference 
for notifications. For example, a driver may not be interested in notifications about 
delays less than 5 minuets. So, he would specify that in his console. Actually, this 
is like having filtering agent at each vehicle that filters traffic notifications based 
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on a driver's preference. 
III.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented the first component of our framework which is an 
architecture for the notification of traffic incidents, NOTICE for short. In NO-
TICE, sensor belts are embedded in the road at regular intervals, every mile or 
so. Each belt consists of a collection of pressure sensors, a simple aggregation 
and fusion engine, and a few small transceivers. The pressure sensors in each belt 
allow every message to be associated with a physical vehicle passing over that 
belt. Thus, no one vehicle can pretend to be multiple vehicles and there is no 
need for an ID to be assigned to vehicles. Underlying philosophies of NOTICE, 
and our framework in turn, is that the decision about traffic-related information 
should rest with the infrastructure and not with individual vehicles that may have 
incorrect or incomplete knowledge. 
Vehicles in NOTICE are fitted with a tamper-resistant Event Data Recorder 
(EDR), very much like the well-known black-boxes onboard commercial aircraft. 
EDRs are responsible for storing vehicles behavior between belts such as accelera-
tion, deceleration and lane changes. Importantly, drivers can provide input to the 
EDR, using a simple menu, either through a dashboard console or through verbal 
input. 
In NOTICE, belts in the same traffic direction communicate with each other by 
disseminating data with the help of passing vehicles. Thus, each two consecutive 




AUTOMATIC INCIDENT DETECTION 
After describing our infrastructures for both belts and vehicles, this chapter is 
devoted to presenting our techniques for automatic incident detection implemented 
on top of NOTICE 
It is important to mention that our techniques are not a replacement for any of 
the current AID techniques Instead, they can provide a complementary support 
to them in order to recover their limitations mentioned in Chapter II 
IV. 1 A DETERMINISTIC TECHNIQUE 
This section is devoted to presenting our first attempt to develop automatic in-
cident detection in VANETs using a deterministic approach [55] Although this 
deterministic technique has many shortcomings, it is worthy to explain it first, 
before introducing our more generic probabilistic approach in the next section, for 
better illustration of the problem at hand 
IV. 1.1 The Roles of Belts 
A belt is responsible for collecting and managing EDR data from passing vehicles 
For the sake of collecting traffic occupancy, each belt maintains a table called 
RoadImage[m][n] where m is number of rows that matches the number of lanes 
and n is number of columns that matches the distance between two consecutive 
belts m some units , we can assume it simply to be m meters 
For example, RoadImage[i][j] = x means that x vehicles have passed over the 
location (lane = i, position = j) m the previous time interval 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 shows the representation of the contents of this table in 
case of no incident, single lane blocking incident in a two-lane freeway and single 
lane blocking incident in a three-lane freeway respectively The x-axis represents 
different points of the road and the y-axis represents the total number of passing 
vehicles through each position 
In the incident free situation, Figure 3, the two lanes have almost the same 
occupancy, as vehicles move freely between them On the other hand, Figures 4 
and 5 show that vehicles would change lanes at some position before the incident 
to avoid it and hence we expect to have positive peaks at incident-free lanes while 
we have negative peaks in the blocked lanes To maintain the Roadlmage table, 
a simple rule may be applied as follows whenever a belt receives an EDR update 
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from a passing vehicle, it increments all the positions that the vehicle has passed 
over by one. 
16 31 46 61 76 91 106 121 136 
position 
FIG. 3: Two lanes incident free situation 
412 549 
Position 
FIG. 4: Incident blocks single lane in two-lane highway 
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1 135 269 403 537 671 805 939 
Position 
FIG. 5: Incident blocks a single lanes in three-lane highway 
As shown in these figures, if an incident occurred, a belt would expect to have 
a negative peak in the row corresponding to the lane containing the incident in the 
Roadlmage table while other lanes are still normal or have positive peaks especially 
for lanes adjacent to the incident's lane. So, one may argue that detecting an 
incident is simply to detect such a peak in the Roadlmage table. 
Although this idea is simple and easy to implement, it has many shortcomings 
that may be explained as follows. Consider the example shown in Figure 6 where 
the numbers in that table represents occupancies for the corresponding lanes and 
the shadowed area represents EDR data that has been just received by a belt, 
i.e the EDR showed that its vehicle has recently passed through the shadowed 
positions. Figure 6(a) shows the contents of a section of the Roadlmage table 
before applying the new EDR. As shown in Figure 6(a), the middle positions of 
lane 1 have very low values meaning that very few vehicles have passed over these 
positions recently. That may be a reason to suspect an incident at these positions. 
If a belt applied the basic filling algorithm, which just counts how many vehicles 
have passed over each position, for the new EDR, then the belt would have the 
table shown in Figure 6(b). 
Figure 6(b) shows that the suspected positions still have very low values relative 
to corresponding positions in the other two lanes that make it still be suspected. 
However, having a vehicle that has recently passed over these positions should 
override previous history for them and remove any suspicion accumulated over 
time about them. The above situation may result in many cases. For example, 
























































































FIG. 6: Illustrating the need for the modified table filling 
a temporary broken vehicle, then a history might be built against some positions 
as shown in Figure 6 until one vehicle passes over these positions. The problem is 
that it would take a very long time until the table becomes balanced again even 
if one vehicle was enough to remove any suspicion about these positions. 
IV. 1.2 Modified Table Filling 
Here, we present our idea to overcome the problems depicted in Figure 6(a). The 
following rule is used to update the Roadlmage table after receiving a new EDR 
from a passing vehicle: If a vehicle has passed over a certain position, this position 
is clear and must have value larger than corresponding positions in other lanes. 
The reason for this is that when a vehicle passes over position (lane = i, position = 
j), it means that this position is clear and any history against this new fact must 
be forgotten. 
Referring again to Figure 6(a), the history of this section of the road is against 
the middle positions of lanei, because they have a very low values. But, once 
a vehicle passes through them, a belt must change this history by making them 
larger than corresponding positions on other lanes as in Figure 6(c). 
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The main advantage of the modified approach is that it has a rapid conver-
gence, once a position is cleared, the table will show that immediately. Thus, any 
temporary problem on the road or any outdated history would not affect the belt's 
decision. Also, after detecting an incident, once a vehicle passes over the incident 
position, the table will show an incident-free status. 
It is noteworthy here to mention that the values in the Roadlmage table now 
do not reflect the number of vehicles that have passed though every position as 
before. Instead, they just reflect the status of the road. 
IV.1.3 Time Dependent Modified Filling 
In Subsection IV.1.2, if a belt receives EDRi from vehicle x at time ti and receives 
EDR2 from vehicle y at time t2 where t\ < t2, we had an implicit assumption that 
x was always ahead of y since the last belt. This is because EDR2 is applied on 
the Roadlmage table after EDR\ has been totally applied. 
Of course, that is not true as a general case as vehicles may accelerate and 
pass each other. Thus, if x arrived at any position before y, y may accelerate and 
arrive at next position before x. 
The simplest example for this situation is when a slow vehicle passes over a 
certain position p then an accident occurs at p. Fast vehicles may arrive first to 
next belt and provide some information about the incident. However, according 
to our technique, when the slow vehicle arrives at the belt, that belt may, wrongly, 
clear that position and give it high value in the Roadlmage table, which is not 
correct. Of course, many more sophisticated examples may be shown here to show 
the effect of time on deducing incidents. 
So, we modify the proposed algorithm to catch these situations as follows. 
First, a belt modifies the Roadlmage table to contain not only the counter for 
each cell but also the last time when that counter was changed. Thus, each cell 
in the table will be on the form < Count, LTime >. 
Whenever an EDR reports that its vehicle has passed over any position, the belt 
checks the reported time with the last time stored in the table for that position, 
i.e the last time a vehicle passed over that position. If the current reported time 
is larger than the last time stored in the cell, or the reported time is smaller than 
the last time by certain threshold, then the belt changes it as described before. 
Otherwise, the belt will simply ignore that report because it is outdated and 
should not override newer reports. 
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IV. 1.4 Incident Detection 
In order to detect whether an incident has occurred on the road or not, a belt 
needs to detect whether a peak with a certain value has occurred in any row/lane 
of the Roadlmage table or not. One way to detect such a peak may be described 
as follows: 
1. Compute the average (/x) and standard deviation (a) for Count values for 
each row in the Roadlmage table, i.e. for each lane. 
2. Find the minimum Count, Countmin 
3. Use the idea of bandpass filter to take away regular oscillation and fluctuation 
from the values. Actually, this step is very important as we are interested in 
large negative peak at some positions given that other positions have normal 
counts. 
4. If a — o — Countmin > K then raise an alarm for an incident, where K is a 
detection threshold that determines how conservative the detection should 
be. The larger the detection threshold, the more conservative the detection 
is, the more detection time is needed and less false alarms are generated. 
IV. 1.5 Table Cleaning 
In order to prevent values in the Roadlmage table from growing to infinity, when-
ever a belt has a small workload, it can clean the Roadlmage table by simply 
subtracting the minimum value from all values in the table. Hence, the status of 
the table is preserved while decreasing its values. 
IV.2 A PROBABILISTIC TECHNIQUE 
Although the deterministic AID technique introduced in Section IV. 1 was novel 
in attempting to solve the AID problem using VANETs, it still suffers from many 
shortcomings. Firstly, it produces many false positive alarms, specially if we are 
interested in short detection time. As we showed in Subsection II.1.3. even a 1% 
false positive alarm rate is not acceptable to traffic operators and drivers. Secondly, 
it does not consider the relationship between positions at which a vehicle has 
changed lanes and the location of the accident. That is whenever a vehicle changes 
lane at location i > 0, the deterministic approach assumed that an accident might 
have occurred at any location between 0 and i in that lane. In other words, the 
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effect of lane change is the same for all of the avoided positions However, we will 
show shortly that this is not true 
Thirdly, both the deterministic technique and other AID models proposed in 
the literature present two major problems that are conducive to increasing levels 
of false alarms, namely calibration complexity and lack of universality (or transfer-
ability) Even the simpler algorithms require considerable calibration efforts (not 
to mention the development of an incident dataset, which is not always available) 
to determine the best algorithm threshold values for each individual, or pair of, 
ILDs/belts Actually, it is very hard to determine what thresholds are reasonable 
for each section of the road thus making the operation of configuring NOTICE 
and other ILD based techniques, very hard 
Finally, and may be most importantly, it is very difficult to incorporate other 
parameters, drivers inputs or deceleration, in the detection process 
In this subsection, we present a probabilistic AID technique based on Bayesian 
theory that avoids the disadvantages of the deterministic technique and other 
existing ILD based approaches [56-58] 
IV.2.1 Basic Idea 
Bayesian networks are known to be used for calculating new beliefs when new 
information (evidence) is available [59] The basic task of the inference system is 
to compute the posterior probability upon arrival of an evidence This is called 
belief updating or probabilistic inference 
For example, if we consider the effect of lane changes on the probability of hav-
ing an incident (accident) on the road Assume that a belt knows from historical 
data that the probability (its belief) of having an accident on a given section of 
the road is p If that belt noticed that there are pieces of evidence about many 
lane changes that are correlated m time and position, then the belt may need to 
update its beliefs about having an incident that might have existed and caused 
these many correlated lane changes 
According to Bayesian theorem, the new belief or posteriori probability could 
be computed as 
„ , , , . , N P(incident = true) * P(chanqe lane\Incident = true) Bel{Incident = true) = — -~ K—— -s -P{change lane = true) 
= a * P{mcident = true) * P{changelane\Incident = true) 
Where P(mcident = true) is the prior probability, P(change lane\Incident = 
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true) is the likelihood and a can be computed by the law of total probability as 
we will show shortly 
In general, let Pr[J] to be the a prion probability (or belief) of an incident / 
at a given position on the road When pieces of evidence E's, correlated in both 
time and position, about an existing incident are collected, a belt will update its 
beliefs by using a Bayesian mechanism A belt computes the posteriori probability 
of an incident / at the given location as 
Bei(/HPr|^||pi=apr|/ |pr|£1;1 (1) 
where Pr[f?|J] is the likelihood, E represents any evidence such as changing 
lanes or passing over a road anomaly and a is computed by the law of total 
probability as 
1 
Pr[J] Pr[£|/] + Pr[7] Pr[£|7] 
(2) 
Where Pi [E\I] is the probability of false information For example, if E is 
driver input, then Pr[E\I] is the probability that a driver inject information about 
non-existing incident 
The general idea of our technique is to start with some beliefs about having 
incidents on the road If there are pieces of evidence about many lane changes, 
sudden deceleration and driver input that are correlated m time and position, then 
a belt updates its beliefs, using Bayesian theory, about having a road anomaly, 
that might exist and that triggered these many correlated pieces of evidence 
Referring back to Equation 1, two values should be computed to incorporate 
any evidence E in the detection process namely Pr[E\I] and Pr[E\I\ 
As already mentioned before, detection thresholds, used by the deterministic 
technique and other ILD AID approaches, are very hard to determine and they 
are just some magic numbers that should be discovered somehow On the other 
hand, our Bayesian based approach uses probabilities to determine the existence of 
incidents and threshold m that context represents how conservative a belt is about 
its detection process Thus, making NOTICE easy to deploy m new environments 
with minimal configurations 
We will start by describing our proposed technique to detect blocking incidents, 
accidents for example Then our approach will be extended to detect potholes as 
well 
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IV.2.2 Blocking Incident Detection 
In this section, we present our approach to detect blocking incidents by collecting 
pieces of evidence about lane changes and driver inputs from passing cars. In 
other words, two types of evidence, lane changes and driver inputs, are considered 
in the detection process. 
Lane Change Model 
Referring to Figure 7, assume that an accident has existed on the road at some 
position y. It is very natural that most vehicles would change lane to avoid the 
accident at some moderate distance away from y, around position p. On the other 
hand, very few vehicles would change lane at a large distance or at a very small 
distance shown as shadowed areas in Figure 7. Hence, the normal distribution for 
lane changes with respect to the incident location applies. It is noteworthy here to 
mention that non dense traffic is assumed where vehicles can easily change lanes 
on desire. On the other hand, the normal distribution may not be appropriate in 
dense traffic where lane change may not be an easy job. Assume that an incident 
Traffic direction 
FIG. 7: An illustration of vehicles changing lane 
has occurred at position y on the road and let X be the random variable that keeps 
track of the position at which vehicles change lanes. Since, as we postulated, X 
is normally distributed, we write 




Driver Input Model 
A number of cell phone-based incident detection mechanisms have been proposed 
in the literature [12] showing that that driver input would provide much help to 
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our incident detection engine. Refer to Figure 8, usually the driver avoids the 
incident first by changing lane from lane 0 to lane 1. Then somewhere after the 
incident, the driver may provide an input about it. Usually most drivers have the 
same behavior and would provide input around position y. Let Y be a random 
variable that keeps track of the position at which a driver would provide input 
after an incident. We can write 
/y(y) = /(D). * erV*. (4) 
where 1(D) is an indicator function that returns 1 if the driver provided an 
input about the incident and returns 0 otherwise. 
..'K 
^ / • \ / I 
" \ 
W t i \ „ ' ' \ Traffic direction 
E-L I i * 
Lane 0 
V x Lane 1 
FIG. 8: Illustrating driver input 
Belts Roles 
As before, a belt is responsible for collecting and managing EDRs data from 
passing vehicles. Each belt maintains a table called TempProb[m}[n] where m 
is number of rows that matches number of lanes and n is number of columns 
that matches number of segments, distance, between two consecutive belts. The 
purpose of this table is to store the probability of having a blocking incident at 
each position, or section, of the road. The higher the value of TempProb[i\[j], the 
higher the expected chance of having an incident at location (lane —i and position 
— j) where all probabilities were initialized to a very small value representing the 
original probability of having an incident on that road. 
When a belt receives EDR data from a passing vehicle, it applies Bayes's 
theorem to update the posterior probabilities for different road positions based on 
the new EDR data. 
We use Figure 9(a) to describe the operations performed when a belt receives 
an EDR from a passing vehicle where the transparent vehicles represents the old 
positions of the solid vehicle while moving. Assume that a vehicle has run over 
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FIG 9 Illustrating the probabilistic technique 
lane 0 from position x to position y at which the vehicle moved to lane 1 Since 
the vehicle has passed over lane 0 from position x to position y, these positions 
between x and y must be clear of any accidents and hence must be assigned a 
very low probability of having a blocking accident there In our example, we 
re-imtiahze TempProb[0][j] for y < j < x Thus, whatever the probability of a 
position was, it would be re-imtiahzed once one vehicle passed over it 
Now, since the vehicle has changed lane at position y, it might have done 
that because of an accident (incident) that existed ahead of that vehicle at lane 
0 Based on this new evidence, a belt would update the posteriori probability of 
having an accident at any of the locations from 0 to y at lane 0 as follow 
TempProb[Q][i\ = ^mPProbl°M * Pvl = a*TempProb[0][i)*Pvt forO<Ky 
P(changelane — true) 
(5) 
where Py^ is the probability of changing lane at position y given that an acci-
dent had occurred at position i and can be computed using Equation 3 and a can 
be computed using Equation 2 
In general, the proposed automatic incident detection technique can be de-
scribed as follow Let us define those positions that a car has passed over as 
passed over positions and the positions that the car has not passed over as avoided 
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positions 
For each position p = (lane = i,position = j) that a car x has passed over, 
p must be clear of any blocking incident and hence must be assigned a very low 
probability of having an incident there So, we set 
TempProb[i][j] = Initial probability 
Thus, irrespective of what the probability of a position was, it would be re-
initialized once a car passed over it 
On the other hand, for each position p = (lane = i,position = j) that a car 
has avoided, the following is performed 
• The belt computes the posteriori probability of having a blocking incident 
at p that forced x's driver to change lane before p as in Equation 1 
TempProb[i][j] = a TempProb[i][j] Py 1 (6) 
where Pyj is the probability of changing lane at position y given that an 
accident occurred at position j and can be computed from Equation 3 and 
a can be computed by Equation 2 
• If x's EDR shows a driver input about position p, a belt also updates the 
posteriori probability as 
TempProb[i][j] = a TempProb[i}[j] PZJ (7) 
where PZJ is the probability that the driver provided input at position z 
given that an incident did exist at position j and can be computed using 
Equation 4 
Thus, to apply the downloaded EDR data, a belt switches between two main 
operations First, the belt re-mitiahzes the probabilities for those positions at 
which the car has passed over Second, the belt computes the posteriori probabil-
ities for those positions that the driver has changed lane to avoid and/or provided 
an input about 
There are two mam scenarios that may need to be clarified Referring to 
Figure 9(b), if the vehicle changed lane back to lane 0 at some position z < y and 
continued there until it met the belt According to our probabilistic technique, 
positions from y to z at lane 1 and from 0 to z at lane 0 would be re-imtiahzed 
Thus, for lane 0, only positions from y to z have a new posteriori probability while 
all other positions for lane 0 were re-initialized 
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The second scenario is when we have a slow vehicle on the road. At this case, 
vehicles may change lane to pass it and they may return after that to the original 
lane. Let us assume that one vehicle C\ changed lane at position P1; another 
vehicle, C2, changed lane at position p2 < P\ , because the slow vehicle is moving, 
and the ith vehicle Ct changed lane at position Pt < Pr-\ < ... < P\. According 
to our probabilistic technique, after receiving C2'EDR data, the probabilities of 
all positions between Pi and P2 would be re-initialized. After receiving CVEDR 
data, the probabilities of all positions between P2 and P3 would be re-initialized. 
In general, after receiving C,'EDR data, probabilities of all positions between Pt_i 
and Pj would be re-initialized. Also, if any of these vehicles returned back to 
the original lane, or even when the slow vehicle arrives at the belt, the remaining 
positions from 0 to Pn would be re-initialized. It is noteworthy to mention that 
to have a large probability for any position, many posteriori updates needs to 
be accumulated over time without any re-initialization. Also, we apply the same 
technique presented in Subsection IV.1.3 to avoid other problems caused by slow 
cars. Thus, it is clear that the probabilistic technique would not report false 
alarms because of slow vehicles or other type of fake incidents. This is because 
vehicles coming after the slow one will change lane at different positions resulting 
in re-initializing probabilities of these positions. 
IV.2.3 Permanent Incident Detection 
As we already mentioned before, one of the strongest points of our Bayesian ap-
proach is the ability to extend it to incorporate many pieces of evidence and also 
to detect various type of incidents. In this section, we describe how to extend 
our approach to detect permanent non-blocking incidents such as potholes on the 
road. There is one main difference between detecting blocking and non-blocking 
incidents. Namely, a driver may pass over a non-blocking incident if he could not 
avoid it while he has to change lane to avoid the blocking one. Thus, not every 
driver will be able to, or have to, change lane to avoid passing over a pothole. So, 
similar to Equation 3, let Z be a random variable that keeps track of the position 




where 1(D) is an indicator function returning 1 if the driver could change lane 
to avoid the pothole and 0 otherwise. 
To enhance our technique's capability of detecting potholes, in addition to vehi-
cle's assumptions introduced in Section III.2, vehicles are assumed to be equipped 
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with a sensing device that can detect when they pass over a speed bump or a 
pothole Similar to all other devices, this sensing device should feed its readings 
to its vehicle's EDR 
Similar to the TempProb table, a belt maintains another table 
PermProb[m][n] where m is number of rows that matches the number of lanes 
and n is the identity of the column that is equal to number of segments between 
each two consecutive belts Moreover, each belt maintains a list ManMade that 
stores information about man-made road anomalies like railroad crossings and 
speed bump positions This information is very helpful to automatically filter out 
these anomalies when reported by cars 
Maintenance of PermProb table can be done m a similar way as TempProb 
as follow 
For each position p = (lane = imposition = j) that a car x has passed over, 
the following steps are performed 
• If x's EDR has a record for a suspected pothole at position p, based on 
the input fed from the sensing device where p ^ ManMade , then the belt 
computes the posteriori probability of having a pothole at this position, 
updates its beliefs, as 
PermProb[i][j] = a PermProb[i][j] Pr[Detection\Pothole] (9) 
where a is computed as discussed before and Pr[Detection\Pothole] is the 
probability that the sensing device successfully detects a pothole when one 
exists 
• If x's EDR shows that x has significantly decelerated around position p, 
p <j£ ManMade, this means that there might be a pothole at position p 
that the driver wanted to avoid or reduce its effect on his car None of the 
techniques proposed in the literature can detect such behavior because the 
car may slow down enough to cancel the effect of the pothole and hence 
no device can detect such potholes when passing over very slowly In this 
situation, the belt needs to update its belief about having permanent incident 
at p as 
PeimProb[i}[j] = a PermProb[i][j} Pr[Reduce\Pothole] (10) 
where a is computed as before and Pr[Reduce\Pothole] is the probability 
that the driver slows down when he sees a pothole This probability depends 
on many factors like driver response and how close are other cars behind the 
driver 
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• If x's EDR shows nothing about position p, two options exist Either that 
position is clear or the driver could avoid the pothole by taking it between 
wheels or maneuvering around it without changing lanes Hence, when x's 
EDR shows nothing about position p, the belt will simply ignore that report 
about p 
On the other hand, for each position p(i, j) that car x has avoided, the following 
steps need to be performed, assuming that x's driver has made the last lane change 
at position y < ] We may need to compute the posteriori probabilities as follow 
It is important first to note that a driver might have avoided position p because 
it may have pothole, a temporary accident or some other non-mcident situation 
such as a slow car 
• x's driver might have changed lanes because of a pothole at p So, the belt 
computes the posteriori probability of having a pothole based on this new 
evidence 
permprob[i}\j] = a permprob[i][j] Py3 (11) 
where Py] is the probability of changing lane at position y given that a 
pothole does exist at position j and can be computed from Equation 8 
In contrast to our technique for accident detection, pothole probabilities are 
never re-mitiahzed after receiving an EDR from a passing vehicle This is because 
a pothole might exist but the driver could avoid it by taking it between wheels 
for example However, if a belt continues updating pothole probabilities with the 
arrival of each EDR showing lane changes, false positive alarms will be generated 
after some time Therefore, it is important to re-initialize pothole probabilities 
after some detection duration to avoid the detection of false potholes If this 
detection duration is very short, shorter than the mean detection time, we may 
never detect any pothole On the other hand, if it is very long, false alarms will be 
eventually generated We will study this parameter setting shortly in Subsection 
IV 4 3 
IV.2.4 Incident Detection 
If any of the computed probabilities exceeds a certain threshold, an alarm is raised 
about an incident at the corresponding position The larger the threshold is, the 
more conservative the belt is, the longer the time needed to detect incidents, the 
less incident detection rate and fewer false alarms reported 
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One of the strong points about our proposed techniques is that the threshold is 
not a magic number that is very hard to set like most traditional AID techniques. 
On the other hand, the values in our case are probabilities that have meaningful 
information and setting a threshold is just how confident a belt is in detecting an 
incident. 
It has been noticed in real roads that lanes do not have equal preference (usage) 
from drivers, i.e. drivers may prefer some lanes over others. For example, if the 
drivers know that certain lane will be right only (or left only) after a while, they 
would prefer to stay away from that lane early enough if they don't want to make 
that turn. 
Thus, some sections of the road may be avoided even if they are clear of any 
incidents. So, we may use different threshold values for different sections of the 
road. For the above mentioned example, we may assign large threshold for those 
not-preferred section to avoid generating many false alarms. 
One of the important points to mention is that a belt will not declare the exis-
tence of incident once it detects a probability larger than the detection threshold. 
It actually declares an incident if the probability exceeds the threshold for mul-
tiple data points to avoid any transient flapping in the probabilities. The same 
technique is also used to declare the clearance of an incident, that is a belt waits 
until the probability is below the detection threshold for some data points before 
declaring the incident clearance. 
One more advantage of the probabilistic approach is its ability to tune the 
initial probability of having an accident on the road. A belt, after its installation, 
may start with a very low probability, < 0.0001. Then as it infers and detects more 
accidents on its local section of the road, it can simply adjust that initial proba-
bility based on current history of accidents making our technique a self learning 
detection engine. 
IV.3 INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING TECHNIQUES 
For permanent incident detection, the proposed technique is novel in the sense 
that none of the existing AID techniques would outperform it in detection rate, if 
any even can detect those kind of incidents at all. However, for temporal incident 
detection like accidents, the proposed Bayesian-based technique would work well 
under non dense traffic. When traffic becomes very dense and/or the incident 
blocks many lanes, vehicles will simply be stuck behind the incident and would 
not be able to continue and provide their information to next roadside and hence 
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the proposed technique would not work as intended. 
Also, we believe that the market penetration will impact the deployment of 
our technique because it will take time until s sufficient number of cars will be 
equipped with EDRs and wireless capabilities. 
Therefore, to overcome these limitations, we propose to integrate our tech-
niques with existing work from literature to provide improved performance as 
market penetration increases. For evaluation purposes, we integrated our proba-
bilistic technique with the California Algorithm. 
The good thing about the proposed NOTICE architecture is that any ILD-
based technique can be implemented perfectly on top of it with minimal changes, 
if any. Thus, NOTICE can be built and installed today on roads and any ILD based 
technique can be implemented on top of it while it also supports the adoption of 
equipped vehicles over time. 
IV.4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
An accurate simulator is a very important part in an incident detection system to 
mimic the exact behavior of vehicles on the road. We developed a mobility traffic 
simulator in Java based on the vehicle following model and Intelligent Driver Model 
(IDM) [60]. Drivers may accelerate or decelerate but should maintain some safety 
distance between cars. Drivers are also divided into two categories: normal and 
greedy drivers, which is a known characteristic of traffic. Greedy drivers try to 
take advantage of every possible situation like changing lanes whenever possible in 
order to speed up when the free distance in the other lane is larger than their own 
lane, several entry points are distributed along the highway with one entry every 
1000 m. Also, a vehicle may take an exit with some probability, and exits are 
distributed one every 1000 m. Different lanes may have different average speeds 
which is a well-known scenario in many areas, and even enforced by law in some 
countries like Germany. 
Unless otherwise specified, we assume a detection threshold of 0.7, the dis-
tance between belts is to 1000 meters, 60% of drivers provide input to the system 
where 10% of those inputs are incorrect, and traffic flow is assumed to be 1200 
vehicles/hour/lane. 
For the sake of different experiments, the traffic is given some time to warm 
up so that cars distribute themselves over the road. Then an accident is deployed 
at random between two belts before it is cleared after some time duration, which 
is 15 minutes unless otherwise specified. If a belt could not detect the accident 
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before its clearance, it is considered undetected 
IV.4.1 Performance Metrics 
The performance of an AID model is usually evaluated using three indices com-
monly adopted in AID research [10] detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR) 
and mean time-to-detection (MTTD), which can be defined as follows 
• Detection rate is defined as the ratio of the number of incident cases correctly 
detected by the algorithm to the total number of incident cases known to 
have occurred 
Number of incidents detected v i n n ( w 
Total number of incident cases 
• False alarm rate is defined as the ratio of the number of false alarm cases to 
the total number of applications or decisions made by the algorithm 
FPR = Number of false alarms JQ00% (13) 
Total number of incident — free input patterns 
• The mean time-to-detect is the average time an algorithm takes to detect 
incidents It is measured as the mean delay m seconds between the appar-
ent occurrence of an incident and its detection, averaged for all incidents 
detected over a period of time 
MTTD = -T(td - t0) (14) 
Where td and t0 are the detection and occurrence times of an incident re-
spectively 
IV.4.2 Temporary Incident Detection 
Impact Of Traffic Flow 
Figure 10 shows the impact of traffic flow on mean detection time for our prob-
abilistic technique, California based technique (CA) and the integration of both 
Under very sparse traffic, the probabilistic technique requires long time to col-
lect sufficient number of reports from passing cars and come up with a confirmed 
probability about the incident As the traffic becomes denser, less time would 
be needed because more cars would exist and provide their input to next belt 
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FIG. 10: Impact of traffic flow on mean detection time for accident detection 
very difficult and cars would slow down or stop to make a lane change and hence 
more time would be needed to detect incidents. 
On the other hand, it is fundamentally difficult for existing techniques , in-
cluding CA, to detect incidents under sparse traffic as the deviation in traffic 
parameters is very small. With the increase of traffic flow, CA was able to detect 
incidents before they are cleared with longer detection time than our probabilistic 
technique. Actually, this is not a surprise as the probabilistic technique is fed with 
more pieces of evidence than traffic occupancies. 
As expected, the integrated approach takes advantage of both techniques. Un-
der sparse traffic flow, the integrated approach behaves like our Bayesian based 
technique. Under dense traffic, the integrated approach inherits the benefits of 
both Bayesian and CA. 
Figure 11 shows the impact of traffic flow on the detection rate. For the same 
reasons described above, as the traffic flow increases, the detection rate for our 
Bayesian approach increases until it becomes 100% at 900 cars/hr/lane. However, 
as we explained before, under very dense traffic, more than 2500 cars/hr/lane, the 
detection rate decreases. 
For CA, under sparse traffic, it could not detect the accident. As the traffic 
flow increases, it would be able to detect more incidents until its detection rate 
reaches 100% under dense traffic. 
Figure 12 shows the effect of traffic flow on false positives for both CA and 
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Traffic flow (cars/hr/lane) 
FIG. 11: Impact of traffic flow on detection rate for accident detection 
the deterministic technique. The probabilistic technique offers a zero false pos-
itive alarms, assuming 0.7 detection threshold, which makes it perfect and very 
trustable to traffic operators. This is because the proposed technique re-initializes 
any position that a car has passed over. Thus, even if some pieces of evidence 
accumulated against some positions by a slow car for example, these pieces of 
evidence will be canceled when a single car passes over these positions. 
Under sparse to moderate traffic flows, CA could not detect any change in the 
traffic parameters and could not even detect real incidents. So, it offers a zero false 
positive rate. As the traffic becomes denser, few false alarms would be detected 
because of the high densities. On the other hand, the deterministic technique de-
tects incidents based on the difference between occupancies at different positions. 
Thus, it may mistakenly generates false alarms more often when density becomes 
large and some cars favors one lane over another. 
Impact Of Detection Threshold 
Figure 13 shows the impact of the detection threshold on the accident mean de-
tection time under different probabilities of driver inputs. This figure shows that 
drivers input provided a great enhancement to the detection process. As expected, 
as the detection threshold increases, more time would be needed by a belt to detect 
the existence of an accident. As also expected, more driver input means simply 
less time to detect the accident when it happens. 
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FIG. 12: Impact of traffic flow on false positive rate for accident detection 
detection using cell phones only that has an average of 5 minutes detection time 
[12]. This is because our technique uses more pieces of evidence such as lane 
change in its detection process. 
Figure 14 shows the impact of the detection threshold on the incident detec-
tion rate under different probabilities of driver inputs. It is not a surprise that 
detection rate decreases with the increase of detection threshold. However, even 
when the belt became very conservative, detection threshold of 0.9, it could still 
provide reasonable detection rate, for example more that 60% under driver input 
probability of only 0.6. 
Impact Of Distance between Belts 
Figure 15 shows the impact of the distance between belts on the mean detection 
time for our probabilistic technique under traffic flow values of 1200 and 1800 
cars/hours/lane. This figure shows that the mean detection times increases slightly 
with the increase of distance between belts. This is expected because cars have 
to travel longer distance to report their EDRs to next belt. However, even when 
belts are installed with 5 km inter-spacing, detection time is still around 3 minutes. 
This shows that the NOTICE architecture is very efficient cost-wise. 
Market Penetration 
Figure 16 shows the effect of the percentage of vehicles equipped with EDRs and 
wireless devices on the mean detection time. For better illustration, we set the 
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FIG. 13: Impact of detection threshold on mean detection time for accident de-
tection 
traffic flow to non dense traffic , 1200 cars/lane/hr, because otherwise the inte-
grated technique will not be affected by the market penetration as it downgrades 
to pure California algorithm. 
This figure shows that down to about 70% penetration, the probabilistic tech-
nique has almost the same performance as 100% case. However, for smaller pene-
tration rates, a longer time would be needed to collect sufficient information from 
EDR equiped vehicles. 
On the other hand, the integrated technique required less detection time than 
the the proposed technique because it is enhanced with the California based algo-
rithm. 
IV.4.3 Pothole Detection 
This section is devoted to presenting simulation results and analysis for pothole 
detection. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that the pothole detection device 
detects a pothole with probability of 0.9. 
Impact Of Traffic Flow 
Figure 17 shows the impact of traffic flow on mean pothole detection time for 
different values of the detection threshold. For sparse traffic, a longer time is 
needed to accumulate more pieces of evidence until the probability of having a 
pothole reaches the specified detection threshold. However, as the traffic becomes 
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FIG. 14: Impact of detection threshold on detection rate for accident detection 
more dense, more cars are available to report about the pothole resulting in shorter 
mean detection time. As an illustration, only about 40 seconds was needed to 
detect a pothole with detection threshold of 90% which is very reasonable time 
for that conservative detection threshold. 
Impact Of Detection Threshold 
Figure 18 shows the impact of the detection threshold on mean detection time 
under traffic flows of both 1200 and 2400 cars/hr/lane and 800 cars/hr/lane. 
As expected, the smaller the detection threshold, the longer the pothole mean 
detection time as a belt needs to accumulate enough pieces of evidence. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the mean detection time does not exceed 2 minutes 
even under large values for detection thresholds. Hence, we can safely choose a 
high detection threshold, > 0.9, to avoid generating false positive alarms. 
Impact Of Detection Duration 
In this experiment, we study the effect of pothole detection duration on the false 
positive alarms. As we already mentioned before, it is important to re-initialize 
pothole probabilities after some detection duration time to avoid the detection 
of false potholes. If this detection duration is very short, shorter than the mean 
detection time, we may never detect any pothole. On the other hand, If it is very 
long, false alarms would be generated. 
Figure 19 shows the impact of detection duration on the false positive rate 
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FIG. 15: Impact of belts spacing on mean detection time for accident detection 
under different detection thresholds. This figure shows that zero false alarms 
are generated for detection duration up to 6 minutes. Joining this with the fact 
that pothole detection time is usually less than a minute, we can choose detection 
duration time to be around 5 minutes. Thus, we can use large detection thresholds 
and avoid generating false negative alarms. 
Impact Of The Sensing Device Detection 
Figure 20 shows the impact of the sensing detection probability, i.e. 
P'(Detection/'Pothole), on the mean detection time under different traffic flow. 
This figure shows that even for P(Detection/Pothole) around 0.5, the detection 
time would be less than a minute. As P(Detection/Pothole) decreases, the mean 
detection time increases. 
IV. 5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented our proposed techniques to enhance automatic in-
cident detection in VANET. We started by proposing a deterministic technique 
where a belt collects EDR data from passing vehicles and maintains a table that 
stores occupancies for all positions between itself and the previous co-directional 
belt. These occupancies are used to detect possible blocking incidents that forced 
drivers to change lanes. A belt can identify blocking incidents by looking for low 
occupancies in one lane where the corresponding positions in adjacent lanes have 
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FIG. 16: Impact of market penetration on mean detection time for accident de-
tection 
higher occupancies. Then we presented a more generic Bayesian based probabilis-
tic technique that incorporates more parameters in the detection process than just 
lane changes. Our probabilistic technique is capable of detecting both blocking 
incidents such as vehicle accidents and non blocking incidents such as potholes. 
Our probabilistic technique also offers zero false positive alarms for most de-
tection thresholds values, which makes it perfect and trustable to traffic operators. 
Also, our probabilistic technique added good enhancements to existing AID tech-
niques in non dense traffic. However, as the traffic becomes denser, it is hard for 
vehicles to avoid the accident and continue to provide their EDR data to the next 
belt. For evaluation purposes, we integrated our probabilistic technique with the 
California Algorithm and showed that this will help detecting blocking incidents 
in all traffic conditions. 
Simulation results showed that our probabilistic technique outperforms Califor-
nia Algorithm under non dense traffic in terms of mean detection time, detection 
rate and false positive rate. To the best of our knowledge, our probabilistic inci-
dent detection technique is the first VANET based approach capable of detecting 
both blocking and non blocking incidents. 
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FIG. 19: Impact of detection duration on false positive rate for pothole detection 
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After detecting an incident, it is important to efficiently disseminate information 
about it to alert approaching vehicles on the road In this chapter, we start by 
presenting traffic analysis while our data dissemination techniques are presented 
m Chapter VI 
Empirical evidence, accumulated over time, has shown that under many high-
way scenarios VANETs tend to be disconnected, consisting of a collection of dis-
joint clusters This chapter is devoted to providing an analytical explanation of 
this result, thus confirming the findings of [36] [34] [61] [62] We show that this 
phenomenon is present even m relatively dense traffic and provide an analytical 
expression of the expected size of a cluster, as a function of traffic density and 
communication range We also show that the cluster size is quite stable and easy 
to maintain [35] Actually, this finding was very important in developing our data 
dissemination approaches 
V. 1 EVALUATING THE PROBABILITY OF LARGE GAPS IN CO-
DIRECTIONAL TRAFFIC 
While traffic displays diverse spatio-temporal patterns, several workers have 
pointed out that an instantaneous snapshot of a steady free flow of uncongested 
traffic can be approximated by uniform car density (measured m cars per kilo-
meter), which translates into a uniform vehicular distribution [63-65] It is very 
important here to mention that we are neithei assume that vehicle's arrival rate 
nor mter-vehicle spacing is uniform We instead assume that if we took a picture 
of traffic at a certain moment, vehicles would appear to be uniformly distributed 
as some vehicles have just entered the highway, others are about to take an exit 
while some others are accelerating/decelerating 
The goal of this section is to provide an answer to the following natural ques-
tion Given that m vehicles are deployed uniformly at random in a single lane 
of traffic of one kilometer and given that dependable radio communications be-
tween vehicles require a maximum inter-vehicle distance of d meters, what is the 
probability that there is end-to-end radio connectivity between the m vehicles7 
This question is fundamental We prove that the number of vehicles per kilometer 
must be at least 16 in order to have a better than even chance for connectivity, 
it takes about 25 vehicles per kilometer for end-to-end connectivity to be present 
49 
with 90% probability. 
Returning to our problem, we model the situation as follows: the m vehicles 
determine m — 1 distinguishable bins (inter-vehicle spaces), enumerated in left-to-
right order as B\, B2, • •. 5m - i - The number of distinguishable ways in which the n 
indistinguishable balls (unit inter-vehicle spaces) can be distributed into the m — 1 
bins is easily seen to be (m+™~2) = ("^--j2)• ^° s e e *^a^ t m s *s *^e c a s e ' observe 
that the m — 1 bins involve m separators and that we can lay down the balls and 
bins in a linear sequence flanked on both sides by a separator. The problem now 
is that of selecting n places for the balls out of a total of n + m — 2 places available. 
The conclusion follows. 
Now suppose that we want a given bin to contain k, (0 < k < n), balls. This 
amounts to distributing k balls into one bin and n — k balls into the remaining 
m — 2 bins. Reasoning as above, the number of distinguishable ways in which this 
can be achieved is (("~fc^(fc
m_3)) = (?+™lt~3) • As a consequence, the probability 
Pk, (0 < k < n), of the event that a given bin contains exactly k balls is 
fn + m — k — 3 \ fm + n — 2\~ ._, „, 
Pk={ n-k ){ n ) • ( 1 5 ) 
To show that the p^s are a valid probability distribution, we need to prove 
that Yl^oPk ~ 1- This, in turn, amounts to showing that ^fc=o ( n-k~ ) = 
(m+™-2). Indeed, recalling that for integers r and n, 
E ( T R + : + 1 ) 
t<n v ' v ' 
(see [66], (5.9) p. 159), we write 
E Pk n ) t-^ \ n — k 
fc=0 v y fc=0 
-1 n m + n — 2\ sr^ ({n — k) + (m — 3) 
m + n — 2^ Y ^ ATO — 3) + i 
m + n — 2\ ~ f(m — 3) + n + 1 
n J \ n 
m + n — 2\~ fm + n 
[by (16)] 
n \ n 
1, 
as desired. 
In our setup, two neighboring vehicles become disconnected if the bin corre-
sponding to the distance between them accumulates at least d + 1 balls, where d 
corresponds to the maximum effective transmission range. Let Az, (1 < 1 < m — 1), 
be the probability that a generic bin Bl contains at least d + 1 balls. 
50 
Lemma V . l . l For alii, (1 < i < m — 1), 
„ . . . fm + n-{d + l)-2\fm + n-2\~1 
V m — 2 ) \ n 
Proof We find it convenient to compute the probability of the complementary 




IE( ( m- s i!:]
B- ' )) 
j = 0 




n ) *-~' , \ t 
t—n — d 
m + n — 2^ ^-^ {(m — 3) + t 
t=o ^ 
m + n — 2\~ " ^ f(m — 3) + t 




m + n — 2\ (m + n — d — 3 
n J *-^ \ t 
t o 
= 1 - . . . 
n J \ m — 2 
Thus, Pr[A] = 1 - Pr[A] = (m+""2)"1(m+m-2~3)- a n d t h e P r o o f o f t h e lemma 
is complete. 
Let A be the event that there is no end-to-end connectivity between the m 
vehicles. Clearly, A = U,^rl
1Al. Since the A,'s are not independent, the principle 
of inclusion-exclusion implies that Pr[.A] = Y^=i -^r[A] — Ei<i<,<m-i Pr[A H 
A3] + --- + (-1)* E i< n < J 2 < <,,<m_iPr[A71 n An n • • • n A,,] + ••• 
Lemma V.1.2 For all i,j, (1 < i < j < m - I), £i<,<j<ro-i ?r[A n A3] = 
(m-l\ lm+n-2{d+\)-2\ (m+n-2\-1 
Proof We provide a purely combinatorial proof. First, to obtain PT[AZ D A3], 
observe that the number of distinguishable arrangements in which bins i and j 
contain at least d + 1 balls is obtained by first placing d + 1 balls in bins i and 
j and then by distributing the remaining n — 2{d + 1) balls uniformly at random 
in all the m - 1 bins. This can be done in {m^Z2$$~2) = (m+"-m
2id2
+1)~2) 
distinct ways. Since there are (m~ ) distinct ways of choosing i and j subject to 
(l<i<j<m — 1), the conclusion follows. 
Lemma V.1.3 For all I < j1 < 32 < • • • < 3% < m — 1, 
Ei<ll<M< .<,.<m-i
Pr^ n ^ n • • • n A,J = C";1) r ^ ^ " 2 ) ( T T ' 
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Proof This follows from Lemma V.1.2 by a simple inductive argument. 
Theorem V.1.4 
Y^m-l /_-, y + i (m-l\ tm+n-t(d+l)-2\ 
Pr[A] = ^ l l j ^nl] m~2 • (17) 
Proof This follows directly from Lemmas V.l.l , V.1.2 and V.1.3, combined. 
Although a closed form for PrL4] is hard to obtain, we have compared the 
results obtained by evaluating (17) for various values of m with those yielded 
by averaging 10 million simulations of an experiment that consists in generating 
uniformly at random m points in the unit interval and checking whether any 
two neighbors are separated by more than 0.2. As illustrated in Figure 21, our 
simulation results are virtually indistinguishable from the analytical result. 
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FIG. 21: Disconnection probability 
One can interpret (17) as follows. Imagine sliding a 1 km window down a 
highway with one lane of traffic in each direction. If the window contains m co-
directional vehicles, then the probability that there is no end-to-end connectivity 
between them is precisely Pv[A\ in (17). For example, should there be 12 co-
directional vehicles in the window, the probability of no end-to-end connectivity 
between them is about 86%. Naturally, the probability decreases with the number 
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FIG. 22: Cluster size 
V.2 EVALUATING THE EXPECTED SIZE OF A CLUSTER 
Since, as we saw, co-directional traffic is inherently partitioned into clusters, an 
interesting question is to estimate the expected size of a cluster. The goal of this 
section is to provide an answer to this natural question. For this purpose, we 
inherit the notation and terminology of Section V.l. 
Theorem V.2.1 The expected size of a cluster is 
E[clustersize] = m. r:~
2) (18) 
(ra+;"2) + ( m - i ) - ( m + r d " 3 ) ' 
Proof As we saw, the probability p that a given bin contains at least d+1 balls is 
p = (m+™Zt~3) (m+"~2) -1- L e t x b e t h e random variable that counts the number 
of "gaps" (i.e., the number of bins containing at least d + 1 balls). Since X is 
binomial, the expected value E[X] of X is 
E[X] (m — 1) • p 
(TO — 1) 
TO + n — d — 3 \ /TO + n — 2 
m — 2 / V n 
(19) 
Once we have the expected number of gaps in co-directional traffic, the ex-
pected number of clusters becomes 1 + E[X] = 1 + (TO - 1) • C " ^ " 3 ) (m+^"2)_1-
Thus, the expected size of a cluster is 
E[clustersize\ = 
m . (m+n-2) 





FIG. 23: Cluster stability 
completing the proof of the theorem. 
Figure 22 provides a side-by-side comparison of the expected cluster size pre-
dicted by (18) and the value obtained by simulation. As an illustration, imagine a 
two-lane road of IKm and 10 vehicles distributed uniformly at random per lane of 
traffic. By virtue of (19) we expect to see about 2.47 clusters; by (18), we expect 
a cluster to contain between 4 and 5 vehicles. 
V.3 CLUSTER STABILITY 
As already mentioned, since co-directional vehicles move at a small relative speed 
with respect to each other, we expect clusters to be quite stable and easy to main-
tain. We defer discussing cluster maintenance until presenting our data dissemi-
nation protocols. In order to get a better understanding of co-directional cluster 
dynamics we have simulated a stretch of highway with two traffic flows of 15 and 
20 vehicles/km. In both cases, the difference between the highest and lowest speed 
is 15km/hour. Figure 23 illustrates, side by side, the average cluster sizes over 15 
minutes of simulation time. In both cases the simulation revealed that in spite of 
mobility, the expected cluster size is remarkable close to the theoretical prediction 
of 10 and 15 vehicles, respectively. Incidentally, this is also indirect validation of 
the uniformity assumption. 
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V.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented an analysis for vehicles traffic proving that discon-
nection in VANET is highly probable even in relatively dense traffic. 
We also provided a formula to compute the expected cluster size in such a 
disconnected environment. We showed that cluster size is relatively small, around 
16 vehicles per cluster assuming 19 vehicles/km. Finally, We showed that the 
cluster size is quite stable and easy to maintain. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first in VANET community to prove 
analytically that disconnection is the norm rather than the exceptions in VANETs 




This chapter is devoted to presenting our data dissemination techniques. We start 
by presenting a clustering technique that will be used during data dissemination. 
Then we present our first data dissemination approach for undivided roads [35, 
67]. Section VI.3 presents our proposed data dissemination technique for divided 
highways. Finally, we answer one of the very interesting questions in incident 
notification which is how far from the incident location should the notification be 
sent. Throughout this section, for generalization, we assume that the source and 
destination are cars rather than belts. However, disseminating packets between 
belts is a special case by assuming that the source and destination cars have zero 
speeds. 
VI. 1 CLUSTERING TECHNIQUE 
Section V shows that traffic is inherently partitioned into clusters disconnected 
from each other where vehicles enjoy end-to-end connectivity within each cluster. 
We have also computed the expected cluster size that was found to be relatively 
small and quit stable. All of these findings have motivated us to propose a clus-
tering technique among cars on the road. 
This section is devoted to discussing this clustering technique which is the core 
of our proposed data dissemination technique. We start by describing the basic 
format of beacons transmitted by cars. Then, we describe the clustering process 
and we show that it has low overhead in terms of bandwidth usage. 
VI.1.1 Cluster Management Beacons 
As stated in our assumptions in Chapter III, we assume cars to be GPS-enabled 
and to communicate using DSRC [68]. Being GPS-enabled, cars know their geo-
graphic position and are synchronized in time. As mandated by DSRC, every 300 
ms each vehicle sends a beacon with a range of about 200-300 m [3]. Each beacon 
contains information that allows vehicles to handshake and synchronize. We are 
using these beacons for cluster formation and cluster maintenance as well. Mind-
ful of their original intent we shall, nonetheless, refer to these beacons as Cluster 
Management Beacons, (CMB, for short). So, it is noteworthy here to mention that 
the clustering process introduces almost zero overhead because these beacons are 
transmitted anyway for many other purposes such as neighbor discovery. Figure 
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24 shows the proposed format of a CMB obtained by taking advantage of unused 
fields of the standard IEEE 802.11 beacon. Each beacon transmitted by a car x 
contains the following information. 
• ts: this field contains a timestarnp with a length of 8 bytes, 
• bi: this field contains beacon interval with a length of 2 bytes, typical value 
is 300 ms. 
• pos: this field contains x's position obtained by the GPS . This position may 
be encoded in 12 bytes [69]. 
• sp: this field contains x's speed measured as miles per hour and is encoded 
in 2 bytes. This value may be negative to determine direction 
• hv: this field contains the position of the header car of x's cluster and is 
encoded in 12 bytes. 
• tv: this field contains the position of the tail car of x's cluster and is encoded 
in 12 bytes. 
• hvs: this field contains the speed of the header car of x's cluster and is 
encoded in 2 bytes. 
• ivsithis field contains the speed of the tail car of x's cluster and is encoded 
in 2 bytes. Finally, there is a 4-byte unused filed. Thus, the CMB beacon 
size is 56 bytes. 
ts bi pos sp hv tv hvs tvs u 
ts timestarnp 
pos GPS position 
hv header vehicle position 
hvs header vehicle speed 
u unused 
bi beacon interval 
sp current speed 
tv trailer vehicle position 
tvs trailer vehicle speed 
FIG. 24: Illustrating the layout of a CMB 
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VI.1.2 Cluster Formation 
To begin, the task of clustering can be performed as follows: each car that has not 
received, within a certain time-out interval, a beacon from a co-directional car in 
front of it, declares itself header of the cluster and sends this information in the 
next CMB to the cars behind it. The message will be then multi-hopped, using 
CMB beacons throughout the cluster. Note that this information is piggybacked 
in regular beacons transmitted by cars. The CMB contains, in addition to the 
identity of the header, its geographic position, direction of movement and speed. 
(Suffice it to say that direction is immediately available if speed if kept as a 
signed integer.) Every co-directional car that receives such a CMB understands 
that it belongs to the cluster named after the header. In a symmetric way, the 
last car in the cluster informs, by virtue of a CMB, all the other cars in its own 
cluster of its geographic position and speed. The head and tail vehicles in a 
cluster, maintained proactively as described, play a special role in our proposed 
dissemination techniques and will be denoted, respectively, by h(-) and £(•). As 
we showed before, clusters are expected to be quite stable and easy to maintain. 
This is because co-directional vehicles move at a small relative speed with respect 
to each other. Figure 25 shows different clusters on a two-lane highway. 
F ED 
h(F) t(F) t(E)=h(E) h(D) t(D) 
t(A) h(A) t(B) b' b h(B) t(c) h(c) 
A B C 
FIG. 25: Illustrating vehicles clusters on a two-lane highway 
VI. 1.3 Maintaining Cluster-Related Information 
A generic vehicle x in a cluster X maintains proactively information about the 
cluster to which it belongs as well as overlapping clusters, that is, clusters in the 
oncoming direction with which a node in x's cluster is in direct radio contact. 
By propagating this information during cluster formation and maintenance, every 
car in the cluster acquires information that allows it to make adequate routing 
decisions. This ability to make routing decisions is of key importance in our 
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dissemination techniques We note that all of the bindings described below are 
soft and are subject to time-out Specifically, x maintains 
• A first record (x cid, x pos, x sp, x X, x O) where 
— x ad is the identity of the cluster to which x belongs, 
— x pos is the current position of x obtained from the on-board GPS 
device, 
— x sp, is the current speed obtained from the on-board speedometer, 
— x X, the sets of all neighboring cars in x's cluster that can be reached 
from x m one hop, these can be easily maintained from their beacons 
— x O, the sets of all neighboring cars in overlapping clusters that can be 
reached from x in one hop, assuming undivided highway 
• A second record, also maintained proactively as described m Section VI 1 2, 
contains information about head and tails of x X 
• A third record contains a flag to determine whether there is any overlapping 
cluster in advance or not and the expected time to lose such overlap This 
information may be maintained as follow Once car y, in cluster Y, detects 
that y O is not empty, it can piggyback such information m its next CMB 
beacon, m the unused field By exchanging beacons, all cars in the y Y will 
be aware about such overlap and its expected duration 
It is important to realize that, by virtue of Theorem V 2 1, the cluster size is 
bounded (see also Figure 22) Moreover, since co-directional clusters tend to be 
stable, and the underling topology of clusters linear, maintaining these records 
proactively is not a problem and we do not run into scalability problems 
Also, we will show shortly that these beacons introduce a small overhead in 
terms of bandwidth wasting while on the other hand they save much bandwidth 
and time in packets propagation As clusters in opposite directions "meet", they 
exchange routing information This allows the cars m each cluster to update their 
routing tables Since the bindings are soft, as these clusters drift away from each 
others, the information is no longer reinforced and will be removed 
VI. 1.4 Clustering Overhead 
Despite being sent anyway for general purposes like handshaking and synchro-
nization it is helpful to show the overhead of beacon transmissions We have 
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performed two experiments to measure both the time needed for cluster mainte-
nance as well as bandwidth used in this maintenance. 
In both experiments, we deployed cars at random but in a single cluster, by 
ensuring that interspacing between each two consecutive cars is less than the 
transmission range . We then, started to compute how much time was needed by 
these cars so that each car in the cluster would have correct information about its 
neighbors and its header car. 
Figure 26 shows the impact of cluster size on the maintenance time, time 
until all cars in a cluster know about its head and tail. As shown in the figure, 
for a relatively large cluster size of 50 cars that may cover a distance over one 
kilometer, less than 5 sec was needed for all cars to learn about head/tail and all 
1-hop neighbors in their cluster. Joining this result with the fact that clusters are 
relatively small and quite stable, as we showed in Section V, we claim that cars 
will have up-to-the-second information about their clusters most of the time. 
A natural question that may arise here is how much bandwidth is being wasted 
in the clustering process? To answer this question, we measured the percentage 
of wasted bandwidth in the maintenance process. Figure 27 shows the impact 
of cluster size on the wasted bandwidth during maintenance. As shown in the 
figure, a very small amount of bandwidth was being wasted. For example, for 
up to 50 cars in a cluster, only about 4% of the bandwidth has been wasted in 
the maintenance process. Even in large clusters of 100 cars that would cover 
a distance more than 10 km, assuming an average of 100 meters interspacing, 
only 8% of the bandwidth would be wasted. Thus, clustering in most cases is a 
lightweight process that consumes little resources. It is important here to mention 
that in a very congested traffic, any greedy packet forwarding protocol would work 
fine and the clustering technique may be stopped. 
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FIG. 26: Impact of cluster size on cluster maintenance time 
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FIG. 27: Impact of cluster size on percentage of used bandwidth 
VI.2 OPERA: OPPORTUNISTIC PACKET RELAYING IN DIS-
CONNECTED VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS 
Now, we are ready to describe our first data dissemination approach namely 
OPERA (Opportunistic Packet Relaymg in Disconnected Vehicular Ad Hoc Net-
works) [35,67]. In OPERA, we assume an undivided highway where cars on 
opposite directions may successfully communicate with each other. 
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VI.2.1 Motivation Example 
Referring to Figure 28, suppose that car a wishes to deliver a packet to car g The 
simplest and most straightforward strategy, which does not require routing at all, 
is for car a to wait until, eventually, it meets car g and can deliver the packet 
directly, as illustrated m Figure 28(c) In such a scenario we say that car a acts as 
a data mule for car g [70] Data mules guarantee delivery and are quite effective if 
the geographic distance between the two cars is modest and the traffic is sparse 
Actually, in very sparse traffic, data mules may be the only workable strategy In 
some cases, however, one can do better than data mules 
The majority of VANET routing protocols assume end-to-end connectivity 
of co-directional traffic with some exceptions like DPP [34] and CAR [26] that 
observed that co-directional cars are grouped into clusters that are disconnected 
from each other 
However, All of these protocols would work as follow, if they could even work 
m this disconnected scenario Consider the example in Figure 28(a) Car a detects 
that the only vehicle m range is car b and sends the packet to it Since the cars 
b, c, d, and e form a cluster, the packet sent to car b, will be multi-hopped, in the 
obvious way, to car e Car e will keep the packet for a while until it meets car 
a to which it will upload the packet as shown m Figure 28(b) Thus, the packet 
that has originated at car a ends up at car a, again Clearly, such a situation 
is most undesirable since a sizable amount of resources has been consumed (in 
signaling and routing the packet) and has achieved nothing In this case valuable 
bandwidth was wasted m routing from a to e (along the chain b, c, d, e) and then 
back to a It would have been much better for car a not to send the packet to b 
at all 
In addition to wasting bandwidth, most of the existing protocols suffer from 
many other disadvantages like routing loops that may exist in the previous example 
if car e misses the connection with car a, it may send the packet to any car behind 
a that would in turn be routed again to a' 
DPP avoids routing loops by applying the idea of custody, that is car a will not 
lelease the packet until it gets confirmation from next co-directional cluster about 
receiving the packet through the oncoming cluster Referring again to Figure 28, 
when car a sends the packet initially to car b and received no confirmation, a 
has to resend the packet again to car c or d after some timeout By doing that, 
more bandwidth is being wasted in addition to wasting time by waiting before 
re-sendmg the packet again This waiting time may result in losing a possible 
overlap between the clusters 
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In OPERA, a packet may "hop" between clusters or cars moving in opposite 
lanes until, eventually, it reaches its destination. In this sense, OPERA is actually 
a hybrid protocol as it alternates between applying proactive routing and data 
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FIG. 28: OPERA: motivation example 
VI.2.2 Clustering 
The previous example suggests that it is important for a vehicle to have some 
idea about the local topology of cars in adjacent clusters as it was better for car 
a to know about the disconnection of car e. Thus, OPERA uses the clustering 
technique described in Section VI. 1 in order to educate vehicles about the local 
topology of the network. 
VI.2.3 The Baseline Algorithm 
The metric we adopt for assessing the performance of OPERA is delivery time 
and, for the same delivery time, hop count. The main reason for this choice is that 
pure data mule achieves optimal hop-count, in fact, a hop count of 1, (see Figure 
28(c)), at the expense of delivery time. An immediate corollary of this observation 
is that in order to optimize delivery time, packets that cannot be routed to an 
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overlapping cluster will be routed, internally, to h(.), the first car in the cluster. 
Nonetheless, to give the reader the full generality of the situation, in the Baseline 
Algorithm discussed below, we assume that an overlapping cluster is available and 
that the packet to be routed is stored by an arbitrary car, not necessarily the first 
car in the cluster. 
The Baseline Algorithm that we discuss in this section is the workhorse of 
OPERA. 
Baseline(a, A, x, X) assumes that some vehicle a in cluster A has a packet to 
relay to a vehicle x in cluster X such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
• a and x are in opposite lanes of traffic, and 
• A U X is a connected graph. 
Refer to Figure 29 for an illustration. 
FIG. 29: OPERA: illustrating the Baseline Algorithm 
Two nodes are within range of each other if their radio connection lasts longer 
than the packet transmission time. Since the cars know their location, this is easy 
to determine. We assume, without loss of generality, that x is to the left of a. 
Baseline(a, A, x, X) works as follows. If x is within range of a, the packet 
is delivered directly. Otherwise, by consulting its routing table, list of all 1-hop 
neighbors, a forwards the packet to a car (in either A or X) that minimizes the 
hop-count to x and start the baseline again. 
Lemma VI.2.1 Assuming correct cluster-related 
information, Baseline(a,A,x,X) correctly relays the packet from a to x along 
a shortest path in A U X. 
Proof The correctness and the optimality of the Baseline algorithm follow directly 
by the choice of the next hop, one that minimized the hop-count to x. 
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VI.2.4 The General Algorithm 
The General Algorithm, General(a, A, x, X), assumes that vehicle a in cluster A 
has a packet to relay to some oncoming vehicle x in (known) cluster X but that 
the graph A U X is not connected. In the terminology of Section VI.1.3, let B 
be the closest co-directional cluster to X that overlaps with A. Further, let D, 
if any, be the leftmost cluster among the clusters that overlap with B. We refer 
the reader to Figure 30 for an illustration. Specifically, in Figure 30(a) cluster B 
overlaps only cluster A and so, A = D; in Figure 30 (b) cluster B overlaps three 
clusters, namely D, C and A, in left-to-right order. 
Traffic direction 
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FIG. 30: OPERA: illustrating the General Algorithm 
Let S be the graph induced by A, B and all the clusters overlapping B. It 
is clear that S is connected and, therefore, one can route the packet held by car 
a to the head of the leftmost cluster co-directional with A in S. By abusing 
notation a little, we let h(S) denote the head of the leftmost cluster that overlaps 
B. Referring to Figure 30, h(S) is either the head of cluster A in Figure 30 (a) 
or the head of cluster D in Figure 30(b). This routing decision is justified by our 
motivating example and the discussion in Section VI.2.3. 
The routing itself can be performed by the following greedy approach. First, 
if h(S) = h(A) then, clearly, all that needs to be done is to route the packet 
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to the head of a's cluster. If, however, h(S) = h(D), for the leftmost cluster D 
co-directional and overlapping B, then the packet is routed using the Baseline 
Algorithm to one of cars, say, b' that has connectivity to some car in cluster D 
and then by the Baseline Algorithm again, to h(S). The algorithm now continues 
recursively, until the packet is delivered to x. We emphasize that car a does not 
know and actually need not to know about clusters C and D: all it knows is 
that cluster B overlaps with some clusters ahead of its own. So, car a formally 
does the following. If it realizes that the oncoming cluster has some overlapping 
with another co-directional cluster on the road, a can know that from beacons 
broadcasted by 1-hop cars in B, then the baseline algorithm is applied until the 
packet reaches that next cluster. Otherwise, it routes the packet to the header car. 
Note that the above algorithm is repeated at each node until the packet reaches 
its destination. 
VI.2.5 OPERA Performance Analysis 
One of the key strengths of OPERA is to mix the idea of data mules and routing 
in a smart way that saves both bandwidth and time. In OPERA even if a local 
route seemed to exist, it may be better for the current car to carry the packet 
until it finds better route that guarantee fast and efficient delivery based on some 
performance metrics. Unlike DPP, any intermediate car in OPERA, not only the 
head and tail, can decide the current optimal route based on the most recent 
information. 
We have integrated our mobility model with an 802.11b Java simulator [71], 
which integrated well with our mobility model, after modifying it to send beacons 
periodically every 300 ms. If a car detects a collision, received a corrupted beacon, 
it may choose another random time to start from. As in [63]. the size of vehicles 
is ignored. 
Messages Overhead 
Figure VI.2.5 shows the bandwidth wasted by DPP, the number of extra messages 
sent by DPP over OPERA, when the oncoming traffic density is 100%, 80% and 
60% of the co-directional direction density. As shown in the figure, DPP has a 
significantly larger overhead than OPERA. As we showed before in Section VI.2.1, 
DPP sends unnecessary messages when the co-directional cluster has no overlap 
with two adjacent oncoming clusters. Hence, co-directional clusters will not be 
able to work as bridges between two oncoming clusters as intended and DPP only 
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wastes the bandwidth. Also, DPP allows a message to be sent to the same vehicle 
more than once as we described before in Section VI.2.1. 
OPERA avoids this overhead by sending a message only if it knows that it 
will achieve some progress along the propagation path; otherwise, it uses cars as 
data mules. Hence, OPERA does not send unnecessary messages. Indeed, Figure 
VI.2.5 shows that for a single packet, DPP would waste much more bandwidth 
than the clustering process. 
Co-directional cars / km 
FIG. 31: DPP Overhead per packet 
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^o-directional cars ' km 
FIG. 32: Impact of cars density on packet delivery time 
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Packet delivery time 
Figure 32 shows the impact of traffic density on the packet delivery time in 
both DPP and OPERA when the ratio between oncoming traffic density and co-
directional density is 1 and 0.8. Figure 32 shows that OPERA outperforms DPP 
in terms of packet delivery time. The reason is that DPP favors the oncoming 
direction over the co-directional direction for packet propagation while OPERA 
does not favor any direction, seeking instead the optimal path to propagate the 
packet. Also, a header car in DPP would send the packet to oncoming cluster and 
wait for confirmation from co-directional cluster on the road. If for any reason, 
this confirmation is lost or did not even exist because there is no such cluster, the 
header car would wait for some time before trying again. 
As it turns out, as the density of the oncoming traffic decreases, OPERA will 
be much faster than DPP. As an illustration, for 15 cars/km in the co-directional 
direction, packet delivery time in OPERA is about 50% of the packet delivery 
time needed by DPP. Under dense traffic, both protocols would have almost the 
same average packet delivery time as the network would be fully connected. 
VI.3 SODA: A SMART OPPORTUNISTIC DATA DISSEMINA-
TION APPROACH FOR DIVIDED ROADS 
In Section VI.2, we presented OPERA and the clustering technique used by it. 
However, OPERA has the assumption that cars on opposite directions have the 
ability to communicate with each other. This assumption is not realistic in some 
highways where the two directions are separated by trees or some obstacles that 
prevent the communication between them. In this section, we present a modifi-
cation of OPERA, which we may refer to as SODA [72], that works on divided 
roads as well by taking of mobility attributes into consideration. 
It is noteworthy to mention that our proposed data dissemination for divided 
roads can be used with OPERA itself to improve data forwarding within a cluster 
before moving to a different cluster on the opposite direction. 
Similar to Section VI.2.1, Figure 33 shows an example of how opportunistic 
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FIG. 33: A divided road motivating example 
Refer to Figure 33(a) where car s wishes to deliver a packet to car e. Let us 
suppose that car s is faster than all cars a, b, c and d and is expected to meet the 
destination first. Most of the existing techniques in literature would work in this 
case as follows: Once car s detects some connectivity to car a on the road, it will 
send the packet to a. Then, the packet will be multi-hopped, in the obvious way, 
through cars b and c until it reaches car d. Since, car d has no connectivity to 
any other car in front of it, it will hold the packet until car s comes within range 
again, since car s is faster, as in Figure 33 (b). 
Thus, the packet originating at car s ends up at car s again. Clearly, it would 
have been better for car s to keep the packet and not send it to car a at all. The 
above example shows how most of the existing protocols may waste bandwidth 
and/or suffer from routing loops. 
To illustrate the basic idea of SODA, consider a multi-lane highway shown in 
Figure 34. Assume that car s carries a packet to be sent to a static destination d, 
d would be also a moving car but packet delivery would not be guaranteed in this 
case. 
If s has no connectivity to any car in front of it on the road, it will simply carry 
the packet. However, if connectivity exists as in Figure 34, then s will have two 
options. The first option is to send the packet to the closest car to d on the road, 
this car can be selected from the list of single-hop neighbors maintained by s. The 
second option for s is to carry the packet and not to send it even if connectivity 
exists. In our motivation example shown in Figure 33, it was better for car s not 
to send the packet as we explained before. 
Returning to our example in Figure 34, using the clustering information main-
tained by cars, car s can decide to send the packet or to keep it based on its 
information about its cluster as follows. 
If car s finds itself expected to meet the destination before the header of its 
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However, if s finds that the header of its cluster is expected to meet the des-
tination before itself, then s will send the packet to the furthest car using its list 
of single-hop neighbors. Then SODA would be applied again by the new holding 
car. 
It is noteworthy to mention that car s, the current holder of a packet, is 
dynamically taking its decision based on the current cluster information updated 
continuously. For example, if s's cluster has merged with another cluster ahead 
on the road, then car s will detect that by the clustering process and take the best 
routing decision based on its current information. 
>' 
" ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Traffic direction 
FIG. 34: SODA: illustration example 
Actually, SODA would be very beneficial when each lane has its own average 
speed, this is usually the case and is even enforced by law in some countries. This 
is because it may be better for a car in the faster lane to carry the packet than to 
send it to cluster of cars in slower lanes then face lack of connectivity. Thus, the 
routing decision in SODA is being done based on both the speeds and connectivity 
between cars. 
VI.3.1 SODA Performance Analysis 
We implemented SODA on top of the traffic simulator described in Section VI.2.5. 
As we have shown in our motivation example, SODA can save much bandwidth by 
avoiding useless transactions and sending packets in a clever way. Unless otherwise 
specified, we assume a four-lane highway with the difference of average speeds 
between each two adjacent lanes equal to 10 meters/sec. We also assume that 
the source and destination are initially 4 km apart from each other. In [26], CAR 
was proven to outperform GPSR [73]. So,we compare SODA with CAR for our 
highway scenario. 
Number of Messages and Bandwidth Usage 
In addition to beacons that are transmitted by both SODA and CAR, CAR has 
a destination discovery process before sending the real data. Thus, we expect 
d 
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vehicles in CAR to send more control messages in addition to unnecessary data 
packets as we explained in our motivation example. Figure 35 shows the impact 
of traffic density on the number of data messages sent to route a single packet for 
both two-lane and four-lane scenarios for both SODA and CAR. 
Figure 35 shows that under sparse traffic, less than 12 cars/km, more data 
messages need to be sent for four lanes than for two lanes. This is because the 
topology changes very rapidly in four lanes as a consequence to large differences 
between speeds in different lanes. As expected, SODA sends fewer number of 
data messages than CAR for all cases especially under non dense traffic density. 
In dense traffic, in which connectivity exists most of the time, SODA would send 
the same number of data messages as CAR. However, the total number of messages 
sent in CAR, control and data, is twice those in Figure 35 because of the route 
discovery process. So, we can say that SODA always sends much fewer number of 
messages than CAR. 
Figure 36 shows the amount of extra bandwidth used by CAR over SODA 
for both two and four lane scenarios assuming packet size of 512 kbytes. This 
figure shows that CAR would waste much bandwidth time in the non-dense traffic 
condition. However, as the traffic becomes dense, connectivity would exist between 
cars and little bandwidth is being wasted, only for the path discovery process. . 
Of course, if we consider large traffic between multiple sources and destination, 
we would expect huge amount of bandwidth to be wasted by CAR. 
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FIG. 36: SODA: Impact of traffic density on wasted bandwidth 
Dissemination Time 
Saving bandwidth and communication resources do not represent much impor-
tance if not joined with efficient dissemination time. In this experiment, we com-
pare the dissemination time of both SODA and CAR when routing a single packet 
over 4 km. 
Figure 37 shows the the impact of traffic density on dissemination time for 
both SODA and CAR. This figure shows that SODA outperforms CAR under all 
traffic conditions and number of lanes. This is because CAR waste much time in 
the discovery process, sending control messages to the destination and then back 
to the source. Figure 37 shows also that SODA has more improvement over CAR 
under non dense traffic than in dense traffic. As an illustration, for traffic density 
of 11 cars/km and 4 lanes, CAR spent about 132 sec in disseminating data while 
SODA required only about 77 sec which is about 40% improvement. 
VI.4 HOW FAR SHOULD A MESSAGE BE PROPAGATED? 
This section is devoted to answering one of the most interesting question that is 
how far should a notification be propagated to alert drivers approaching incidents? 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to answer this important 
question in VANET research. If the notification is propagated for a short distance, 
drivers may not be alerted early enough to make appropriate decisions to avoid 
being blocked behind the accident. On the other hand, propagating the notifi-
cation for a longer distance will waste a lot of expensive limited resources, like 
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FIG. 37: SODA: Impact of traffic density on dissemination time 
bandwidth, and moreover drivers far away from the accident may consider these 
alerts as false alarms and if happened more frequently they may even turn off their 
devices to avoid getting these many unnecessary alarms. 
Refer to Figure 2 in Chapter III, assume that belt A' is aware of the acci-
dent and has informed belt A about that. Vehicles in the opposite direction of 
the accident may be used to carry the message in order to notify other vehicles 
approaching the accident as described before in Section III.5. The message will 
be propagated by vehicles like y to belts B, C, D and so on. So, the problem at 
hand is when should a belt decide to stop propagation of the message? A good 
answer for that question is that a belt should stop propagation of a message when 
it detects that cars on the opposite direction are running normally and have not 
been backed up yet behind the accident. Furthermore, those cars also should have 
at least one exit before being backed up behind the accident. Referring back to 
our example, if belt C infers somehow that cars are running normally between D' 
and C", it may inform belt C about that. Thus, belt C may assume that it is not 
important to propagate the message to belt D and the message propagation may 
be interrupted. 
Thus, the general approach can be described as follows. 
• Each belt, A, computes the probability, PABnorrn„n that traffic between itself 
and the previous belt B, on same direction, is normal (cars are not stuck 
yet). 
• Each belt A sends the probability computed in the previous step to its 
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adjacent belt A' on the opposite direction. 
• Upon receiving the probability of normal traffic from opposite belt on the 
other direction, PABnormon
 a Deft A' propagates the alert messages, if any, to 
next belt on the road with probability 1 — PAB 
* J ri~LJ not ma l 
The following subsections are used to describe each step of the general approach 
in more detail. 
VI.4.1 Computing the Probability of Normal Traffic 
The purpose of computing Pnormai is to have an indication whether cars are getting 
stuck behind an accident somewhere in front or they still can freely move as usual, 
it is not intended to detect the accident itself. 
Therefore, an easy efficient way to compute this probability is to use the run-
ning average speed computed by a belt as a good indication. So, each belt can 
compute the probability that traffic flow is normal or slower than usual. For exam-
ple, if a belt computes the running average speed as Sactuai, which will be provided 
to the belt as part of the EDR information. Let us also assume that the expected 
speed for that section of the road at that (time, day, date) is Sexpectea; then a belt 
may compute the probability of normal traffic, Pnormah
 a s 
* normal TTllTl{oactual/ ^expected) ±) 
VI.4.2 Heart Beating 
Every time interval. 30 seconds or so. each belt computes the probability of normal 
traffic, Pnormah and sends this probability to its adjacent belt on the opposite 
direction to help the latter make its decision of notification propagation. 
VI.4.3 COX Distribution 
The COX distribution is a generalization of the phase-concept by Erlang [74]. The 
phases are independent of each other and are exponentially distributed random 
variables with parameter uz, i = 1 , 2, ..., n. The arrangement of the phases is 
given in Figure 38. The COX distribution may be described as follow. Consider 
a service facility with n phases of service channels (nodes). The service time 
distribution at node (phase) i is exponentially distributed with parameter \il. A 
job (customer) enters from the left and moves to the right. After receiving service 
74 
FIG. 38: Cox distribution 
at node i, the customer may leave the system with probability 1 — a% or move to 
next node with probability at. 
We can define the probability of having exactly i phases as 
i - i 
P, = (l-a,)n°* (20) 
fc=i 




For better notation, let us name belts on the road as 61,62,-- and 61,62,... 
Moreover, let us assume that a message is being propagated in the direction of 
61 to 62 to 63 and so on. The problem at hand, of identifying how far should a 
message be propagated, has the same behavior of the COX distribution where: 
• The waiting time at each stage is equivalent to the time of propagating 
messages between belts. A belt waits for some time before it gets the message 
from previous one on the road to be able to make its decision to forward it 
to the next belt or not. 
• After receiving the message, a belt i will propagate the message to the next 
belt with probability 1 — -Pj,i+i„07m„, or it may stop the propagation with 
probability P,,t+i„orr„„( 
Similar to Equations 22 and 24, we can write the probability that the message 
propagation will stop after exactly 1 phases as 
1 - 1 
P, propagation. exactly „l — *l,l + Kormal ±\\ *k,k + lno[ mai J (22) 
fc=i 
We can also define the probability of the message being propagated for at least 
i + l belts as 
QatJeastjt ~ J[J_(^ — ^k,k <=+!„ rial ' (23) 
fc=i 
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And the expected number of belts to receive the message, how far should a 
message be propagated, would be 
oo 
^ ~ / jV1 * ipropaqation-exactlyji) \^"*J 
VI.5 SUMMARY 
Chapter V provided a proof that end-to-end connectivity is not guaranteed in 
VANET meaning that traffic is partitioned into clusters. Chapter V also provided a 
way to compute the expected cluster and showed that clusters are quite stable over 
time. All of these findings have motivated us to develop our data dissemination 
techniques in VANET that take disconnection into consideration. 
In this chapter, we started by proposing a vehicles clustering technique so 
that each car within a given cluster maintains information about its neighbors as 
well as information about the header vehicle of its cluster. Simulation experiments 
showed that vehicles will have up-to-the-second information about its cluster while 
using little bandwidth in the maintenance process. 
We also proposed our data dissemination approach for undivided roads namely 
OPERA. In OPERA, a packet may hop between clusters or cars moving in opposite 
lanes until, eventually, it reaches its destination. In this sense, OPERA is actually 
a hybrid protocol as it alternates between applying proactive routing and data 
mules in a clever way to avoid delay or bandwidth wasting. The main theme of 
OPERA is to send a packet only if it will make progress in the dissemination 
process. Simulation results showed that OPERA outperforms DPP in terms of 
delivery time and bandwidth used. 
Following OPERA's philosophy, we proposed another data dissemination tech-
nique, SODA, for divided roads taking vehicles mobility and lack of connectivity 
into consideration. In SODA, faster vehicles take higher priority of keeping pack-
ets even if connectivity exists as long as these faster vehicles are expected to meet 
the destination before other cars in their clusters. Simulation results also showed 
that SODA outperforms CAR in terms of delivery time and number of messages. 
Finally, we provided an answer to one of the very challenging questions that 
is how far should a notification be propagated to alert approaching drivers. We 
developed a probabilistic technique for belts to keep propagating packets to previ-
ous belts as long as they are detecting lower average vehicles speed than historical 
known average speed for that section of the road. By mapping the problem at 
hand to a standard COX distribution, we provided a formula for the expected 
number of bets to receive the notification when an incident is detected. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SECURING NOTIFICATION DISSEMINATION 
In Chapter VI, we have presented and discussed techniques for notification dis-
semination between belts for both divided and undivided roads as well as how 
far should a message be propagated. However, messages exchanged between belts 
have to be secured against different kinds of attacks [75]. This chapter is devoted 
to presenting security techniques used for secure data dissemination. We are con-
cerned here about two main aspects of security: Firstly, making sure that vehicles 
receive notifications from real belts rather than someone throwing fake devices on 
the road. Secondly, securing the message propagation between belts to avoid some 
possible threat attacks that will be listed shortly. 
General belt to vehicles communication were summarized in Section III.3. 
However, the intention of this chapter is how to secure data dissemination be-
tween cars as well as allow vehicles to accept and process only data sent by real 
belts. 
VII. 1 THREAT MODEL 
First, we illustrate different threats that we are concerned with in notification 
dissemination 
• Tracking a vehicle: A very dangerous and ignored fact about privacy is that 
innocent looking data from various sources can be accumulated over a long 
period and evaluated automatically revealing much information about these 
sources. Even small correlations of the data may reveal useful information. 
For instance, the knowledge about specific sensor characteristics may give 
some hints about the make and the model of the passing car. This in turn 
may be related to other information to identify a specific car. 
As privacy sometimes contradicts with security requirements, any security 
technique should not allow malicious attackers to violate drivers privacy. 
While system operators want to find or identify attackers to take proper 
countermeasures, the ability to do so may be used for less than noble reasons. 
• Replaying old messages: An attacker may sit by the road with a small device 
that records communication between belts and vehicles. Then it replays 
these messages to deceive other vehicles. Thus, he may send old information 
to passing vehicles about an incident that does not exist anymore. 
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• Eavesdropping: In this type of attack, a malicious driver or person may 
try to record all messages sent by belts or vehicles in order to gain some 
information about vehicles and their drivers from a simple analysis of these 
messages. 
• Changing the message: An attacker may try to change a message in order 
to change its meaning or even to corrupt it. 
• Black hole: One of the dangerous attacks in data dissemination in NOTICE 
is to have a vehicle that is not cooperating and is trying to stop the prop-
agation of messages and notifications. This may be a person sitting by the 
road receiving messages from vehicles and dropping them or he may be a 
driver that does not cooperate in notifications forwarding. 
• Giving vehicle incorrect information: An attacker may put a small device 
over the road impersonating a belt and telling cars incorrect information 
about fake incidents on the road. 
VII.2 NOTATIONS 
We use the following notations throughout the rest of this section: 
• {M}k is the result of encrypting message M with a key k. 
• [C]k is the result of decrypting the cipher C using a key k. For example, for 
a symmetric key k, if C = {M}k then M = [C]k 
• Pubhcx is the public key of node, vehicle or a belt, x. 
• Privatex is the private key of node x. 
• keyAB is a shared symmetric key that is known by both A and B 
• M\ | M2 is the resulting message of concatenating two messages Mi and Mi 
• A —> B : M means that node A, vehicle or a belt, sends a message M to 
node B. If B is *, this means that A is broadcasting M. 
• The term message refers to an encrypted message that a belt wants to 
communicate with next belt by the help of passing vehicles. The term 
notification refers to a traffic-related information that a belt informs ve-
hicles about. For example, when a belt detects an incident on the road, it 
sends a message to next belt on the opposite direction to notify approaching 
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cars Then the latter in turn will send notifications for cars to avoid the 
incident 
VII.3 BELTS FUNCTIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This section is devoted to describe belts assumptions and functions that are needed 
to enhance security of NOTICE and to provide defense against different attacks 
listed in Section VII 1 
• As has been described in Chapter III, any message exchanged between two 
consecutive belts is encrypted with a shared secret symmetric key known 
between them This is important to prevent any attacker from changing or 
corrupting any message exchanged between two belts Also, an attacker will 
not be able to understand the contents of the encrypted message 
• A belt gives a message to more than one vehicle to increase the probability 
of being received by next belt This is because drivers may take an exit, stop 
by the traffic shoulder or even be malicious So, relying on one vehicle is not 
practical and some forms of redundancy need to be maintained However, 
the more vehicles to get the message from a belt, the more saturated the 
communication medium will be after that in order to disseminate all of these 
messages to next belt This will in turn prevent man m the middle attacks, 
m other words minimizing the probability of having such attack m place 
• In addition to the shared symmetric key between any two consecutive belts, 
all belts withm a given region share a private key that may be changed 
over time by some distribution authority, or belts can simply have a timed 
manner m switching between key chain, where the corresponding public 
key is well known between cars 1 e may be available over the Internet 
or broadcasted frequently over cellular network or satellite communication 
using PKI certificates This is also important to provide a way for passing 
drivers to authenticate belts as we explain m the next item 
• If a belt has a message to send to the next belt, it will timestamp and sign 
that message using its private key It is very important here to mention 
that the signature is being done offline, not in the limited communication 
time between a belt and a car So, if a belt has a message to send, it will 
encrypt and sign that message while waiting for first passing car to start 
the dissemination to next belt By signing a message and adding timestamp 
to it, passing vehicles can authenticate belts and accept notifications only 
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from real belts. On the other hand, this will also prevent an attacker from 
sending fake messages to passing drivers. 
VII.4 VEHICLES FUNCTIONS AND ASSUMPTION 
This section provides a description for vehicles functions and assumptions in en-
hancing the security of NOTICE. 
• Vehicles are constantly receiving the belt's public key for their area through 
satellite communication or cellular networks. These can be done by the use 
of standard PKI certificates that are widely used in distributing public keys 
in modern systems. 
• Vehicles accept notifications about traffic conditions from belts or cars as 
long as they are signed using the belt's private key and it has not expired 
yet. So, no attacker can put a device that impersonates a belt and sends 
false notifications about non existing incidents. Moreover, that same at-
tacker cannot also send fake message to next belt on the road as no car will 
cooperate in delivering his messages to next belt. 
• Each vehicle that receives a message directly from a belt will never drop that 
message until it gives it to the next belt by itself. So, data mules are still 
working behind the scene, so that if some form of black hole exists, there is 
a chance for the message to be delivered. We may note here that a vehicle 
that receives the encrypted message from another vehicle, not directly from 
a belt, in the dissemination process will discard this message once it forwards 
it. 
• While approaching a belt, not within the small communication time, a vehi-
cle encrypts its EDR data using belt's public key before sending this data to 
next belt. Thus, only real belts can decrypt such information to do analysis 
and no attacker can understand EDR information which in turn preserves 
drivers privacy. Moreover, this prevents attackers from performing analysis 
similar to those performed by belts and getting some knowledge about this 
highly classified information that should reside only with authorized entities. 
• All vehicles have the same communication range. So, if vehicle x can send 
to vehicle y, then x can also receive from y. 
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VII.5 SECURE DISSEMINATION 
We may now start describing the rest of our secure data dissemination technique. 
When a vehicle x passes over a belt A that has a message to be sent to next belt 
B and/or a notification for x, the following will happen. 
1. A —> x : Idx\msgld\{msg}KeyAB\
,notifications\expires.at\AslgrL 
Basically, a belt A sends a message that consists of : 
• Idx: a unique identifier for each message sent by A. This may simply be an 
random unique identifier string generated by the belt 
• msgld : An unique identifier generated randomly at the belt to uniquely iden-
tifies the message itself. So, msgld is unique for same message {msg}KeyAB 
even if it was sent to multiple cars while Idx should be changing 
• {rnsg}KeyAB '• A message that needs to be communicated securely with belt 
B 
• notifications: Any notification that belt A would like x to be aware of, such 
as any incident/accident ahead on the road 
• expires_at: A time after which this message should be discarded. This will 
in turn limit the impact of replaying message attacks because a message will 
be invalid after a limited time. 
• Asign: A's signature for that message. 
It is worthy here to mention that if A does not have a message for B nor a 
notification for x, it will send the remaining parts to x to be used as a proof it has 
passed recently over the belt. 
It is very important also to emphasize that a belt will start communication 
only with real moving vehicles using doppler effect to avoid having a person sitting 
beside the belt and trying to perform a DOS attack on the belt. 
By verifying Astqn for the message, x can authenticate A. If that authentication 
was successful, the notification would be displayed to x's driver console and x will 
try to propagate the message to next cars on the road as we will describe next. 
Let us assume for now that vehicle x has detected that there are some other 
vehicles ahead of it on the road and vehicle y has been selected by the dissemination 
technique to be next hop. 
Therefore, to avoid routing holes if y is a malicious attacker, x will try to 
authenticate y first before dropping the the message as follows. 
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• x —> y Idx\msgld\{msg}KeyAB\notifications\expire-at\Asign 
By sending the message it received from the belt, x is authenticating to y that 
it is a real vehicle that has passed recently over the belt If y could successfully 
verify A's signature and make sure that the message has not yet expired, it will 
send the message it received from A, when it first passed over A So, the following 
will be performed at y 
• If this is a new message, using the message id, then it shows the relevant 
notifications to y's console 
• If y's position is beyond BPos, y has already passed the belt, then it ignores 
that request Otherwise continue to next step 
• y —> x Idy\{msg}KeyAB\notifications\expiresMt\Asign 
By receiving the message from y that contains Idy and A's signature, x can 
verify that y is a real car that has passed recently over A 
The same thing will be repeated again with y when it tries to propagate the 
message to another car z selected by the dissemination process with the exception 
that y will discard the message once it can authenticate z Remember also that 
x, the car the received the message directly from A will never drop the message 
until it delivers it itself to B 
According to the previous protocol, it is very clear that the following con-
straints are maintained and verified between x, y and A Firstly, x and y can 
verify that A is a real belt using A's signature and the expires_at values Sec-
ondly, y could verify that x is a car that has passed recently over A and the 
message to be propagated was really sent by A Finally, x, or any car in the 
dissemination process, could verify that y is a real car that has passed recently 
over A 
One of the possible attacks to the proposed technique is to have a malicious 
driver D\ who receives a real message from a belt and then stops by the road 
replaying same message to all passing cars It is very clear that this is a limited 
attack as the message will expire and no car will accept it after the expires_at time 
Also, having the msg%d will allow B to easily accept the first message received and 
mark the others as duplicates 
VII.6 NUMBER OF COPIES TO SEND 
One of the very important parameters m message propagation is how many cars 
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FIG. 39: Impact of misbehaved drivers on number of copies 
giving a message to a car that may take an exit before the next belt, stop by the 
traffic shoulder for some reason or even be a malicious person who tries to stop 
message propagation between belts. We simply refer to all of these, from the belt 
point of view, as Misbehaving Driver (MD). 
Figure 39 shows the effect of the number of copies on the probability that the 
message would reach next belt under MD probabilities of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. 
Figure 39 also shows that up to MD probability of 60%, 5 copies would give 
a very high probability that the message would reach next belt. Actually, this 
result is important because it emphasis hat a belt does not need to flood the 
entire vehicle fleet with messages for next belt. 
This figure also shows that 9 copies of a message should be sufficient even 
under misbehaving drivers probability of 0.8. 
VII.7 BELTS CLUSTERING 
One of the very important aspects that has not been addressed yet is a belt's 
failure. What happens if a belt B fails? Unfortunately, if a belt B fails, then 
no other belt would be able to decrypt msgAB sent from A to B and hence, all 
incidents detected by A, or by any other belt before A, will never be propagated 
beyond B. i.e. B becomes a black hole in message propagation. 
Another problem is the operational load of managing private keys installed in 
belts. If a belt was compromised, then the private key has to be changed to avoid 
having a malicious user sending incorrect data to drivers. However, the process 
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of changing that key will be very difficult if all belts share the same private key 
Note that it is highly recommended to change private keys manually to prevent 
the compromised belt from getting the new key 
The answer to the above two concerns is clustering By having belts on the road 
forming clusters, where a cluster consists of a group of belts, managing keys can be 
easier and moreover the probability of having a black hole can be reduced Within 
a single cluster, belts share a secret symmetric key to communicate messages 
effectively as well as sharing same private key that would be used by passing cars 
to authenticate belts in that cluster Moreover, each belt in a cluster maintains 
a shared symmetric key with the previous and next clusters on the road For 
example, m Figure 40, there exist three clusters A, B and C where all belts within 
each cluster share same private key, symmetric key as well as shared symmetric 
key with previous and next clusters For illustration, all belts in cluster B share 
same private key, maintain a shared symmetric key between themselves keys and 
with clusters A and C 1 e keyAB and keysc 
There are many advantages of belts clustering that can be summarized as 
follows 
• If a belt b2 in cluster B fails and becomes completely out of service, then 
any message sent by b\ can still be decrypted at 63, since all belts withm B 
share same symmetric key for encrypting messages Also, if belt bi, the first 
one m the cluster failed, then 62 would still be able to decrypt any message 
sent by a3, the previous cluster, since all belts in B share keyAB 
The problem however is when belt 63 fails, which is the last belt in the 
cluster, that is supposed to encrypt the message using the shared symmetric 
key with the next cluster, keyBc This problem can simply be addressed by 
redundancy So, last belt in each cluster may be replicated to reduce the 
probability of having a black hole in message propagation as we will describe 
shortly Even if no redundancy employed, the probability of having black 
hole in NOTICE is still much lower than the no clustering case 
• If a belt 62 is compromised, then the operator will have only to change 
Bpnvate, keyAB and keyBC which were known to 62 Hence, managing the 
compromised belt does not require enormous effort m NOTICE if the cluster 
size is relatively small 
• Message propagation within the same cluster can be much faster now as 
each belt will not need to decrypt/encrypt the message propagated from 
previous belt to next one, since they all share same symmetric key For 
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FIG. 40: Belts forming clusters 
example, referring again to Figure 40, if belt b\ detected an incident and 
started message propagating to belt 62, b2 can just pass the message to belt 
63 without any decryption/encryption since 63 can decrypt any message sent 
by 61 using the cluster symmetric key. 
A natural yet important question is how large should a belt cluster be? On one 
extreme, if all belts form a single cluster then having any belt compromised would 
require a tremendous work from the operator to manage installing new keys in all 
belts and even worse, a malicious user would control all aspects of NOTICE if no 
one detected the compromised belt and can send fake messages to adjacent belts 
as well as fake notifications to passing vehicles. On the other extreme, if cluster 
size equals 1, no clustering, then a single belt failure means a black hole in message 
propagation between belts before and after that failed belt which will result of not 
alerting approaching drivers and got them all stuck behind the incident. 
Let n be total number of belts of a given section of the highway and m be 
number of belts within a cluster, then 
n 
Number of clusters — 
m 
(25) 
Moreover, let us assume that Pf is the probability that a single belt fails and 
cannot do its functions any more. In case of cluster size equals 1, no clustering, 
we can write the probability of having black hole, PuackMoie as 
Ptlack-hole = 1 - ( 1 " PfT ( 2 6 ) 
For example, if n = 1000 belts and Pj = 0.01 then PbiackJioie = 0.9999 which is 
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not an acceptable probability and simply means that black holes will be the norm 
in NOTICE rather than the exception. 
Let us now consider the general case when belts forms clusters of size m, then 
the probability of having a black hole is the probability of having a failure in the 
last belt of a cluster, since the last belt is responsible for encrypting the message 
using next cluster's key. We can write Pbia.ck.hoie a s 
n 
PblackMole = 1 - (1 - Pf)™ (27) 
For example, if n = 1000, m = 50 and Pf = 0.01, we would have PbiackJwie 
= 0.182 which is a great improvement over no clustering for such relatively small 
cluster size. Even better, if we install number of replicas of the last belt in each 
cluster equals to r , then we can write PuackJioie a s 
n 
Pbla.ck.hole = 1 - (1 - P p m (28) 
For example, if r = 2, n = 1000, m = 50 and Pf = 0.01, then Pbia.ck.hoie = 
0.004 which is a very appealing probability of failure for such a small overhead 
of installing one extra belt for every cluster of size 50 belts. Table 1 summarizes 
the probability of having a black hole for some values of n, m, r and Pf. As an 
illustration, having a small cluster size of only 5 belts with no redundancy for 
the last belt will result in over 400% improvement over no clustering for n = 50. 
Moreover, the overhead of managing cluster of size 5 is very little and will be very 
easy to the operator to control. 
VII.8 SUMMARY 
Security is an essential component for any safety application for notifying drivers 
about traffic incidents. Otherwise, an attacker may send notifications about fake 
incidents, which discredit the otherwise useful system. In this chapter, we pre-
sented a technique to secure message dissemination and incident notification in 
NOTICE. We started by listing possible security threats that may affect NO-
TICE. Then we proposed enhancements to both belts and vehicles functions to 
make them resilient to the listed attacks. 
Finally, we presented a belt clustering scheme to reduce the probability of 
having a black hole in the message dissemination if a belt fails and also to reduce 
the operational burden if a belt is compromised. We showed that even a small 
cluster size of 5 or 10 belts per clusters can significantly reduce the probability 
of having black holes in the data dissemination and is easy to maintain by traffic 
operators. 
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In this thesis, we proposed a novel framework for incident detection and notifica-
tion dissemination in VANETs. Our framework consists mainly of three compo-
nents: system architecture, traffic incident detection and notification dissemina-
tion. We also proposed a security technique to prevent possible attacks in message 
propagation and incident notification. 
The first component of our framework is an architecture for the notification 
of traffic incidents, NOTICE for short. In NOTICE, sensor belts are embedded 
in the road at regular intervals every mile or so. Each belt consists of a collec-
tion of pressure sensors, a simple aggregation and fusion engine, and a few small 
transceivers. The pressure sensors in each belt allow every message to be asso-
ciated with a physical vehicle passing over that belt. Thus, no one vehicle can 
pretend to be multiple vehicles and there is no need for an ID to be assigned 
to vehicles. Vehicles in NOTICE are fitted with a tamper-resistant Event Data 
Recorder (EDR), like the well-known black-boxes on-board commercial aircraft. 
EDRs are responsible for storing vehicles behavior between belts such as acceler-
ation, decelerations and change lanes. Importantly, the driver can provide input 
to the EDR, using a simple menu, either through a dashboard console or through 
verbal input. 
NOTICE'S belts collect data from passing cars about their experience on the 
road such as lane changes, stoppages, accelerations and deceleration. This infor-
mation in turn is fed to our incident detection engine. We proposed techniques 
to enhance automatic incident detection in VANET. We started by proposing 
a deterministic technique where a belt collects EDR data from passing vehicles 
and maintains a table that stores occupancies for all positions since previous belt. 
These occupancies are used to detect possible blocking incidents that forced drivers 
to change lanes. A belt can identify those positions by looking for low occupancies 
in one lane where the corresponding positions in adjacent lanes have higher occu-
pancies. Then we presented a more generic Bayesian based probabilistic technique 
that incorporates more parameters in the detection process than just lane changes. 
Our probabilistic technique is capable of detecting both blocking incidents such 
as vehicle accidents and non blocking incidents such as potholes. Our probabilis-
tic technique added good enhancement to existing AID techniques in non dense 
traffic. However, as the traffic become denser, it is hard for vehicles to avoid the 
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accident and continue to provide their EDR data to the next belt. For evaluation 
purposes, we integrated our probabilistic technique with the California Algorithm 
and showed that this will help detecting blocking incidents in all traffic conditions. 
Our probabilistic technique also offers zero false positive alarms for most detec-
tion thresholds values, which makes it perfect and trustable to traffic operators. 
Simulation results showed that our probabilistic technique outperforms California 
Algorithm under non dense traffic in terms of mean detection time, detection rate 
and false positive rate. To the best of our knowledge, our probabilistic incident 
detection technique is the first VANET based approach capable of detecting both 
blocking and non blocking incidents. 
Once an incident is detected, notification about this incident should be sent 
to all drivers approaching it. For this purpose we proposed data dissemination 
techniques designed specifically for VANET. We started by performing analysis, 
confirming empirical results found by other researchers, proving that VANETs 
tend to be disconnected in many highway scenarios, consisting of a collection of 
disjoint clusters. We have also measured the expected cluster size and we found 
that co-directional clusters tend to be relatively stable. Based on these traffic 
characteristics, we developed two data dissemination approaches that effectively 
disseminate messages in both divided and undivided roads to disseminate data in 
an opportunistic way. For undivided roads, we proposed an opportunistic data 
dissemination approach called OPERA. In OPERA, a packet may hop between 
clusters or cars moving in opposite lanes until, eventually, it reaches its destina-
tion. In this sense, OPERA is actually a hybrid protocol as it alternates between 
applying proactive routing and data mules in a clever way to avoid delay or band-
width wasting. The main theme of OPERA is to send a packet only if it will make 
progress in the dissemination process. Simulation results showed that OPERA 
outperforms DPP in terms of delivery time and bandwidth used. 
Following OPERA's philosophy, we proposed another data dissemination tech-
nique, SODA, for divided roads taking vehicles mobility and lack of connectivity 
into consideration. In SODA, faster vehicles take higher priority of keeping pack-
ets even if connectivity exists as long as these faster vehicles are expected to meet 
the destination before other cars in their clusters. Simulation results also showed 
that SODA outperforms CAR in terms of delivery time and number of messages. 
We also provided an answer to one of the very challenging questions that is how 
far should a notification be propagated to alert approaching drivers. We developed 
a probabilistic technique for belts to keep propagating packets to previous belts 
as long as they are detecting lower average vehicles speed than historical known 
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average speed for that section of the road. By mapping the problem at hand to 
a standard COX distribution, we provided formulas for the expected number of 
bets to receive the notification when an incident is detected. 
Finally, we presented a technique to secure message dissemination and inci-
dent notification in NOTICE. We started by listing possible security threats that 
may affect NOTICE. Then we proposed enhancements to both belts and vehicles 
functions to make them resilient to all possible attacks while preserving privacy 
of the drivers. We also presented a belt clustering scheme to reduce the proba-
bility of having a black hole in the message dissemination while reducing also the 
operational burden if a belt is compromised. 
VIII. 1 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
In this section, we discuss some ideas to extend our framework with more function-
alities. We identified three directions to extend the proposed framework, which 
can be listed as follows: 
1. Detect incidents in dense traffic 
In this thesis, we proposed AID techniques where NOTICE'S belts collect 
EDR data directly from passing vehicles and perform some analysis to detect 
possible incidents. This will work well in none dense traffic as we pointed be-
fore in Chapter IV. However, in dense traffic and having a blocking incident 
that blocks one or more lanes, it would be difficult for vehicles to change 
lanes and reaches out to the next belt to provide their EDR information. 
Therefore, it is beneficial if a technique is developed so that cars, which are 
stuck behind incidents, can disseminate their EDR data to the next belt by 
the help of other cars. 
2. Integrate NOTICE with the Internet 
One of the possible future research directions is to integrate NOTICE with 
the Internet. With this feature, the outcome of the incident detection engine 
can be fed to the Internet so that drivers can access such information from 
any place, and it is not necessary to be in the proximity of the incident. With 
this feature also, drivers can make appropriate decision before even reaching 
the incident location. On the other hand, traffic management can take a 
proactive role in managing alternative routes that drivers are expected to 
take to avoid the accident. 
3. Advertisements in NOTICE 
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With the governments strugglingly to install traffic lights and patch the 
roads, it is hard to deploy new systems like NOTICE especially those that 
may be offer free services to the public. Therefore, it would be great if 
NOTICE is self-funded. One easy way to provide funding to NOTICE is to 
have belts advertise advertisements to passing cars about gas prices, hotel 
rates, restaurants and other possible services in the local proximity. It is 
noteworthy to mention that advertisements should be done in the belt's 
free cycle when it has nothing about traffic incident to tell passing cars or 
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